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CHAPTER	I	
Introduction	Alexithymia	refers	to	the	inability	to	label	and	describe	one’s	own	emotional	experience.		The	term	was	originally	coined	by	Sifneos	(1973),	literally	translated	into	a	“lack	of	words	for	emotions”	(a	–	lack,	lexis	–	words,	thymos	–	emotions).	The	construct	was	initially	used	to	describe	patients	with	somatic	symptom	disorders	who	exhibited	marked	difficulty	verbalizing	their	feelings	and	observed	struggling	to	differentiate	emotional	and	physiological	cues	(Sifneos,	1973)	to	the	chagrin	of	their	psychotherapists	(e.g.,	Krystal,	1982;	McDougal,	1982;	Overbeck,	1977).	After	nearly	45	years	of	research	examining	the	construct,	alexithymia	is	no	longer	considered	a	deficit	in	emotional	vocabulary	per	se,	but	considered	a	general	deficit	in	the	cognitive	processing	of	emotional	experience	(Lane,	Ahern,	Schwartz,	&	Kaszniak,	1997).		Alexithymia	is	thought	to	involve	impoverished	emotion	concepts	(Kashdan,	Barrett	&	McKnight,	2015;	Lindquist	&	Barrett,	2008),	or	mental	representations	of	experiences,	situations	and	actions	that	accompany	particular	emotional	states	(for	discussion	of	emotion	concepts,	see	Barrett,	2006;	Niedenthal,	2008).		Such	knowledge	is	critical	for	the	formulation	of	an	individual’s	experience	of	the	world	and	subsequent	behaviors.			Conceptual	knowledge	is	accessed	when	correlates	of	an	emotional	experience	exceed	a	critical	threshold	(Niedenthal,	Winkielman,	Mondillon	&	Vermeulen,	2009).		Alexithymia	may	be	associated	with	an	abnormally	high	threshold	by	which	emotionally	relevant	information	crosses	into	conscious	awareness	(Lane	et	al.,	1997;	Nook,	Lindquist	&	Zaki,	2015).		For	example,	alexithymia	is	associated	with	with	altered	interoceptive	awareness	(Herbert,	Herbert	&	Pollatos,	2011),	or	awareness	of	internal	bodily	states	
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(Cameron,	2011),	which	is	critical	for	the	formulation	of	subjective	feelings	states	(Craig,	2009;	Critchley,	Wiens,	Rotshtein,	Öhman	&	Dolan,	2004;	Damasio,	1994;	Damasio,	2003).		Niedenthal	et	al.	(2009)	describe	emotion	as	embodied;	that	retrieving	relevant	conceptual	information	about	emotion	involves	partial	reenactment	of	emotional	states	in	the	somatosensory	systems.		Some	argue	that	alexithymia	is,	at	it’s	core,	a	deficit	in	interoceptive	awareness,	and	that	this	deficit	interrupts	normal	range	emotional	processes	such	as	the	embodied	experience	of	emotion	(Herbert	&	Pollatos,	2012).	Alexithymia	is	dimensional	(Taylor,	Bagby,	&	Parker,	1999)	and	transdiagnostic.		Longitudinal	studies	show	that	though	absolute	levels	of	alexithymia	can	change	over	time,	they	remain	relatively	stable	(see	Cameron,	Ogrodniczuk,	&	Hadjipavlou,	2014).		Less	is	known	about	how	alexithymia	changes	throughout	development,	largely	due	to	a	lack	of	validity	of	measures	in	youth	(i.e.,	<18,	Parker,	Eastabrook,	Keefer	&	Wood,	2010)	and	older	adult	(i.e.,	>60,	Henry,	Phillips,	Maylor,	Hosie,	Milne	&	Meyer,	2006)	populations.		Based	on	clinician	observations,	measurement	cutoff	scores	were	established	to	indicate	a	clinically	problematic	level	of	alexithymia	(Taylor	et	al.,	1999).		In	normative	populations,	10%	of	individuals	meet	criteria	(e.g.,	Salminen,	Saarijärvi,	Äärelä	Toikka,	&	Kauhanen,	1999).		A	meta-analysis	of	gender	effects	concluded	that	though	results	across	studies	are	inconsistent	and	the	effect	small,	men	do	generally	score	higher	on	measures	of	alexithymia	(Levant,	Hall,	Williams	&	Hasan,	2009).	Because	knowledge	of	one’s	emotional	experience	facilitates	effective	coping	(Fukunishi	&	Rahe,	1995;	Gohm	&	Clore,	2002;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007;	Parker,	Taylor,	&	Bagby,	1998;	Salavoy	et	al.,	1995;		Swart,	Kortekaas,	Aleman,	2009),	which	is	closely	related	to	health	outcomes	(Desteno,	Gross,	&	Kubzansky,	2013	for	review),	it	is	not	surprising	that	
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clinical	levels	of	alexithymia	are	much	higher	in	myriad	mental	and	physical	health	disorders	compared	to	normative	samples	(Leweke,	Leichsenring,	Kruse	&	Hermes,	2011;	Lumley,	Beyer	&	Radcliffe,	2008).		The	construct	is	also	associated	with	a	range	of	problematic	psychosocial	features	(Aaron,	Benson	&	Park,	2015;	Grynberg,	Luminet,	Corneille,	Grèzes	&	Berthoz,	2010;	Vanheule,	Desmet,	Meganck	&	Bogaerts,	2007).	
A	Case	for	Studying	Alexithymia	
	 Continuing	to	elucidate	the	alexithymia	construct	has	important	public	health	implications.	 Thousands	of	studies	demonstrate	the	overlap	between	alexithymia	and	mental	and	physical	health	outcomes,	yet	still,	little	is	known	about	their	relationship	and	how	alexithymia	affects	long-term	outcomes,	including	success	of	psychotherapy.		
Alexithymia	is	elevated	in	clinical	populations.	Alexithymia	is	related	to	problematic	health	behaviors	and	outcomes	in	a	many	important	domains.		It	is	elevated	in	psychiatric	populations	including	major	depressive	disorder	(Honkalampi,	Hintikka,	Laukkanen,	&	Viinamäki,	2001),	schizophrenia	(van’t	Wout,	Aleman,	Bermond,	&	Kahn,	2007),	and	posttraumatic	stress	disorder	(Yehuda	et	al.,	1997).			It	is	prevalent	in	approximately	50%	of	individuals	with	autism	spectrum	disorders	(Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Silani	et	al.,	2008).		It	is	ubiquitous	in	disorders	involving	utilization	of	problematic	coping	behaviors,	including	substance	abuse	(Coriale	et	al.,	2011),	eating	disorders	(Pinna,	Sanna	&	Carpiniello,	2015;	Taylor,	2000)	and	aggression	(Velotti	et	al.,	2016).		 In	general	populations,	it	is	associated	with	decreased	use	of	effective	coping	skills,	such	as	reappraisal,	emotional	expression,	and	seeking	social	support	(Fukunishi	&	Rahe,	1995;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007;	Parker,	Taylor,	&	Bagby,	1998;	Swart	et	al.,	2009).		Instead,	those	with	heightened	levels	of	alexithymia	rely	on	ineffective	coping	strategies,	including	
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emotional	suppression	and	avoidance	(Panayiotou	et	al.,	2014;	Parker	et	al.,	1998;	Swart	et	al.,	2009).		This	pattern	of	coping	is	associated	with	risk	of	psychopathology	and	adverse	health	outcomes	(see	Aldao,	Nolen-Hoeksema,	&	Schweizer,	2010	and	Desteno,	Gross,	&	Kubzansky,	2013	for	reviews).			Alexithymia	is	elevated	in	populations	with	medical	complaints,	particularly	in	somatic	symptom	disorder	and	related	disorders,	independently	of	other	psychopathological	symptoms	such	as	depression	(Mattila	et	al.,	2008).		Baudic	et	al.	(2016)	show	that	alexithymia	prior	to	breast	cancer	surgery	is	the	best	predictor	of	developing	chronic	pain	in	women	one-year	post-surgery,	more	so	than	a	variety	of	psychological	factors	including	catastrophizing,	repression	and	body	image.		This	longitudinal	study	adds	empirical	support	to	theories	postulating	alexithymia	confers	risk	for	the	development	of	physical	health	conditions.	Taylor	&	Bagby	(2004)	argue	that	alexithymia	may	lead	to	misperceiving	the	physiological	correlates	of	emotion	as	signs	of	physical	illness.		In	turn,	heightened	focus	on	aspects	of	physiological	arousal	can	increase	their	perceived	physical	intensity.	This	increases	risk	of	harmful	appraisals	and	cognitive	elaborations,	particularly	about	health	outcomes	(Garland	et	al.,	2011;	Kano	&	Fukudo,	2013).		
Alexithymia	and	empathy.		Alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	empathy.		Those	with	heightened	alexithymia	show	reduced	activation	of	regions	involved	in	empathic	processing	in	imaging	studies	(Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007;	Silani	et	al.,	2008).		Self	report	studies	consistently	show	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	forms	of	“mature	empathy,”	including	perspective	taking	and	empathic	concern	(e.g.,	Aaron	et	al.,	2015;	Grynberg	et	al.,	2010;	Silani	et	al.,	2008;	Sonnby-Borgstrom,	2009).		This	
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association	may	help	explain	findings	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	elevated	interpersonal	problems	(e.g.,	Vanheule	et	al.,	2007).	Compelling	work	in	the	field	of	autism	spectrum	disorders	(ASD)	demonstrates	how	consideration	of	alexithymia	can	shed	light	on	long-held	assumptions	about	clinical	populations.		Despite	the	widespread	assumption	that	ASD	is	associated	with	decreased	empathy,	landmark	work	by	Bird	et	al.	(2010)	and	Silani	et	al.	(2008)	shows	that	only	ASD	participants	with	elevated	levels	of	alexithymia	demonstrate	empathic	deficits.		Bird	and	Cook	(2013)	propose	“the	alexithymia	hypothesis,”	arguing	that	emotional	symptoms	of	ASD	are	due	to	the	high	co-occurrence	of	alexithymia	in	this	population	and	not	due	to	ASD	
per	se.		The	same	may	be	true	for	other	disorders	as	well:	Aaron	et	al.	(2015)	show	that	alexithymia	accounts	for	the	established	correlation	between	empathic	deficits	and	schizotypy,	personality	traits	that	indicate	a	predisposition	towards	schizophrenia	(Claridge,	1990;	Lenzenweger,	2006,	2011).	Similarly,	Brewer	and	colleagues	(Brewer,	Cook,	Cardi,	Treasure	&	Bird,	2015)	show	that	facial	emotion	recognition	deficits	in	eating	disorders	are	attributable	to	alexithymia	and	not	an	eating	disorder	diagnosis.		Continuing	to	investigate	how	alexithymia	contributes	to	established	deficits	in	various	psychiatric	diagnoses	has	the	potential	to	illuminate	inconsistencies	in	research	and	guide	targeted	remediation	(Bird	&	Cook,	2013).	
Alexithymia	influences	psychotherapy	outcomes.	Despite	much	conjecture,	there	is	a	dearth	of	evidence	examining	patterns	of	directionality	between	alexithymia	and	physical	and	mental	health	outcomes;	however,	with	thousands	of	cross-sectional	studies,	the	link	between	them	is	undeniable.		Considering	their	vast	overlap,	it	is	exceedingly	important	to	understand	this	relationship	from	a	psychotherapeutic	standpoint.		This	is	
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particularly	true	given	most	modern	psychotherapeutic	orientations	emphasize	emotional	processes	(Grabe,	Spitzer,	&	Freyberger,	2004).		Though	alexithymia	first	emerged	to	characterize	individuals	who	demonstrated	poor	outcomes	in	traditional	talk	therapy	and	elicited	frustration	in	therapists	(e.g.,	Krystal,	1982;	McDougal,	1982;	Overbeck,	1977),	it	is	still	associated	with	poor	psychotherapy	outcomes	(Ogrodniczuk,	Piper,	&	Joyce,	2011	for	review).		 Fortunately,	intervention	generally	improves	relative	levels	of	alexithymia.		A	recent	review	of	23	treatment	studies	concluded	that	general	psychotherapeutic	intervention	results	in	reductions	of	alexithymia	in	many	different	clinical	populations,	including	depression,	anxiety,	eating	disorders,	and	mixed	psychiatric	samples	(Cameron	et	al.,	2014)	using	a	wide	variety	of	clinical	approaches.		More	work	is	needed	to	determine	whether	functional	changes	accompany	alexithymia	reductions;	at	least	one	study	suggests	they	do;	Tulipani	et	al.,	2010	show	that	pain	levels	and	alexithymia	decrease	simultaneously	following	a	6-month	cognitive	and	emotion-focused	intervention	for	individuals	diagnosed	with	cancer.		A	recent	review	(Pinna	et	al.,	2015)	examines	alexithymia	in	the	context	of	interventions	for	eating	disorders,	spanning	a	wide	variety	of	treatment	approaches	(e.g.,	weekly	cognitive	behavioral	therapy,	inpatient	psychoanalysis,	pharmacological	treatment).	Consistent	with	Cameron	et	al.	(2014),	Pinna	et	al.	(2015)	show	relatively	stable	levels	of	alexithymia	with	absolute	reductions	in	some	treatment	groups;	however,	they	observe	those	with	high	alexithymia	at	baseline	show	poorer	therapy	outcomes	overall.	Conversely,	Morie	et	al.	(2015)	show	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	increased	likelihood	of	cocaine	abstinence	in	an	internet-delivered	cognitive	behavioral	therapy	
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(CBT)	treatment	for	individuals	with	cocaine	use	disorder.		These	findings	highlight	the	likely	moderating	impact	of	alexithymia	on	treatment	outcomes;	depending	on	treatment	parameters	and	clinical	diagnosis,	alexithymia	may	be	associated	with	better	or	worse	outcome.		Early	intervention	may	have	the	potential	to	reduce	alexithymia.		Brackett	et	al.	(Brackett,	Rivers,	Reyes,	&	Salovey,	2012)	show	that	a	curriculum	designed	to	promote	awareness,	expression	and	regulation	of	emotions	improves	social	skills	and	academic	performance	among	5th	and	6th	graders.	Kircanski,	Lieberman	&	Craske	(2012)	train	individuals	to	label	their	emotions	when	approaching	a	feared	stimulus,	a	spider.		Compared	to	other	emotion	regulation	strategies	(reappraisal,	distraction),	those	coached	to	employ	emotion	labeling	showed	reduced	anxiety	and	increased	willingness	to	approach	the	spider.		Alexithymia	generally	improves	in	response	to	tasks	that	are	not	formal	interventions.		Biekie	(2008)	shows	that	a	4-week	expressive	writing	paradigm	resulted	in	reduced	doctor’s	visits,	reduced	depression	scores,	and	reduced	sleep	disturbances	among	those	with	elevated	alexithymia.		Constantinous	et	al.	(2014)	show	that	physiological	and	subjective	aspects	of	emotional	experience	normalize	in	those	with	elevated	alexithymia	when	participants	are	instructed	to	engage	in	deep	emotional	processing.	It	is	likely	that	alexithymia	has	moderating	and	mediating	effects	on	interventions	that	vary	by	intervention	design	and	clinical	population.		As	evidence	about	how	intervention	influences	alexithymia	emerges,	so	do	theories	and	recommendations	for	improving	psychotherapeutic	outcomes	in	individuals	with	elevated	alexithymia.		Cameron	et	al.	(2014)	recommend	structured	skill-based	therapies	such	as	CBT	as	well	as	a	treatment	approach	that	places	emphasis	on	emotional	processes.		From	the	provider’s	
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perspective,	they	highlight	the	potential	utility	of	increased	reflective	listening	and	empathic	resonance,	as	well	as	managing	counter-transference	when	frustration	arises.	Pinna	et	al.	(2015)	put	forward	a	similar	set	of	recommendations,	and	highlight	the	need	of	adapting	interventions	to	better	serve	individuals	with	eating	disorders,	a	population	in	which	rates	of	alexithymia	are	high	(Taylor,	2000).		Morie	et	al.’s	(2015)	intervention	highlights	the	potential	utility	of	internet-delivered	interventions	for	those	with	elevated	alexithymia,	which	are	in	line	with	the	recommendation	to	offer	a	structured	approach	with	reduced	one-on-one	participation	demand.	Early	accounts	of	alexithymia	suggested	the	trait	prevents	meaningful	change	in	response	to	psychotherapy;	fortunately,	intervention	research	demonstrates	this	is	not	the	case.		Those	with	heightened	alexithymia	across	clinical	diagnoses	have	the	potential	to	benefit	from	psychotherapy,	and	it	is	essential	the	field	determine	how	to	best	help	these	individuals	improve.	A	critical	next	step	in	this	field	is	to	examine	recommendations	from	experts	empirically,	and	to	investigate	factors	that	promote	seeking,	adherence	to,	and	benefit	from	psychotherapeutic	interventions.		Consideration	of	intervention	approach,	design,	and	clinical	population	is	crucial	in	this	line	of	work,	as	well	as	attention	to	the	moderating	and	mediating	effect	of	alexithymia	on	modern	psychotherapeutic	approaches.	
Measuring	Alexithymia	Alexithymia	is	typically	assessed	using	self-report	questionnaires	or	interviews.		The	most	common	tool	for	assessing	alexithymia	is	by	far	the	20-item	Toronto	Alexithymia	Scale	(TAS-20;	Bagby,	Parker,	&	Taylor,	1994)	which	is	lauded	for	making	wide-scale	alexithymia	research	possible.		It	is	comprised	of	three	factors:	difficulty	identifying	feelings	(DIF),	difficulty	describing	feelings	(DDF),	and	externally	oriented	thinking	(EOT).		
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The	first	two	scales	assess	one’s	ability	to	reflect	on	their	own	emotional	experience.		The	EOT	scale	reflects	a	cognitive	style	with	preference	for	focusing	on	the	details	of	everyday	life,	rather	than	internal	processes	such	as	thoughts,	feelings,	and	fantasies.		The	TAS-20		measure	has	been	translated	in	over	20	languages,	and	its	three-factor	structure	has	been	cross-validated	by	confirmatory	factor	analysis	in	Western	European,	East	Asian,	and	Middle	Eastern	countries	(Taylor	&	Bagby,	2013).	Vorst	&	Bermond	(2001)	developed	an	additional	questionnaire	measure	of	alexithymia,	the	Bermond-Vorst	Alexithymia	Questionnaire	(BVAQ),	to	address	the	critique	that	the	TAS-20	lacks	a	factor	related	to	“experience	of	emotional	feelings.”		The	BVAQ	includes	two	additional	scales	measuring	affective	experience:	reduced	fantasizing	and	reduced	experiencing	of	emotional	feelings.		The	validity	and	reliability	of	this	measure	is	less	clear	than	that	of	the	TAS-20,	and	the	inclusion	of	the	two	additional	factors	is	questioned	(see	Taylor,	Bagby,	&	Luminet,	2000;	Lumley,	Neely,	&	Burger,	2007;	Morera,	Culhand,	Watson	&	Skewes,	2005).		Factor	analyses	demonstrate	that	variance	in	fantasizing	is	accounted	for	in	the	TAS-20,	and	some	researchers	suggest	“reduced	experiencing	of	emotional	feelings”	is	more	aptly	characterized	as	a	correlate	of	alexithymia,	rather	than	a	core	feature	(Zech,	Luminet,	Rime,	&	Wagner,	1999).	Thus,	the	TAS-20	remains	the	most	common	tool	for	assessing	alexithymia.	Additional	interview	measures	exist	as	well.	The	Beth	Israel	Hospital	Psychosomatic	Questionnaire	(Sifneos,	1973)	is	a	17-item	questionnaire	completed	by	an	interviewer	or	observer.		Although	this	measure	demonstrates	concurrent	validity	with	the	previous	versions	of	the	TAS-20,	it	lacks	reliability	good	inter-rater	reliability	(Taylor	&	Bagby,	2004).		Other	interview-based	assessments	of	alexithymia	include	the	24-item	Toronto	
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Structured	Interview	for	Alexithymia	(TSIA;	Bagby,	Taylor,	Parker,	&	Dickens,	2006),	which	correlates	modestly	with	self-reported	alexithymia.		The	33-item	Observer	Alexithymia	Scale	(OAS;	Haviland,	Warren,	&	Riggs,	2000)	relies	on	collateral	ratings	from	family	members,	friends,	and	therapists.		The	latter	observer	measures	are	relatively	new	and	have	not	been	widely	tested	(Lumley	et	al.,	2007).			As	interview	measures,	administrations	of	these	batteries	can	be	cumbersome.		Though	they	can	be	useful	in	clinical	settings,	they	are	generally	not	efficient	for	research	purposes.	Early	developments	in	interview-based	assessments	of	alexithymia	were	essential	for	laying	a	foundation	for	this	body	of	research.		The	advent	of	self-report	measures,	easily	administered	and	interpreted,	to	assess	alexithymia	facilitated	wide-scale	alexithymia	research.		However,	existing	measurement	tools	have	significant	limitations.		People	with	a	high	degree	of	alexithymia	may	not	be	reliable	in	assessing	their	own	affective	deficits	on	a	self-report	scale	(Leising,	Grande,	&	Faber,	2006).		High	negative	affect	associated	with	alexithymia	may	confer	negative	self-bias	that	could	increase	endorsement	of	alexithymic	characteristics.		In	addition,	reliance	on	these	measures	limits	experimental	manipulation,	essential	for	determining	causal	pathways.		An	important	next	step	in	this	field	is	developing	an	objective	laboratory-based	assessment	task	to	avoid	the	pitfalls	of	self-report	and	promote	more	experimental	alexithymia	research.	
Affective	Experiences	in	Alexithymia		 Accumulating	behavioral	research	points	towards	patterns	of	abnormal	emotional	experiences	in	alexithymia.		In	particular,	utilization	of	imaging	methodology	in	alexithymia	research	yields	valuable	information	regarding	its	neural	correlates,	and	recent	reviews	of	the	literature	have	helped	pave	the	way	for	a	more	coherent	framework.	However,	still	
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much	is	unknown	about	the	how	the	construct	relates	to	behavioral	phenomena,	and	inconsistencies	in	the	literature	limit	the	generation	of	clear	themes.	
Neurological	abnormalities	in	alexithymia.	The	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC)	and	anterior	insular	cortex	(AIC)	have	entered	the	spotlight	of	alexithymia	research.	The	ACC	and	AIC	are	involved	in	interpreting	physiological	cues	of	one’s	emotional	experience,	and	integrating	this	information	into	a	subjective	representation	of	one’s	emotional	state	(Bechara	&	Naqvi,	2004),	visually	depicted	in	Figure	1.		Gu	et	al.	(2013)	propose	that	the	AIC	serves	to	integrate	bottom-up	interoceptive	information	from	top-down	information	from	the	ACC	and	prefrontal	cortex.		Together,	the	AIC	and	ACC	are	thought	to	comprise	an	“interoceptive	cortex”	(Craig,	2002),	facilitating	and	integrating	awareness	of	interoceptive	cues,	and	contributing	to	the	sense	of	self.	
		
Figure	1.		Summary	of	the	role	of	the	AI	and	ACC	in	integrating	interoceptive	information	to	create	an	emotional	state.		From	Bechara	&	Navqui	(2004);	image	created	by	Kamul	Masuta.	The	ACC	is	associated	with	many	functions	correlated	with	consciousness,	including	attention	and	response	selection	(Lane	et	al.,	1998).		Lane	et	al.	(1987)	propose	the	ACC	
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mediates	the	association	between	alexithymia	and	impaired	conscious	awareness	of	one’s	emotional	state.		This	is	consistent	with	the	high	prevalence	of	alexithymia	in	somatization	disorders,	as	abnormal	ACC	activation	may	reflect	amplification	of	physical	sensations.		Abnormal	ACC	activity	in	alexithymia	in	well-established	(Berthoz,	et	al.,	2002;	Kano,	Hamaguchi,	Itoh,	Yanai,	&	Fukudo,	2007;.		Karlsson,	Näätänen,	&	Stenman,	2008;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007;	for	review,	see	van	der	Velde	et	al.,	2013).	The	ACC,	along	with	the	medial	prefrontal	and	insular	cortices,	form	a	network	characterized	by	the	presence	of	Von	Economo	neurons	(spindle	cells)	found	only	in	highly	complex	and	social	species	including	humans,	higher	primates	and	elephants.		This	network	area	is	thought	to	contribute	to	the	sense	of	self	(Craig,	2009;	Craig,	2009b).		The	AIC	receives	information	from	internal	bodily	states,	and	integrates	these	sensations	into	a	subjective	feeling	(Craig,	2009;	Damasio,	1994).	Alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	AIC	activation	in	response	to	various	emotional	stimuli	(Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Kano	et	al.,	2003;	Reker	et	al.,	2010;	Silani	et	al.,	2008).		Theories	endorsing	the	role	of	the	AIC	in	alexithymia	suggest	alexithymic	traits	might	be	the	result	of	a	failure	to	engage	the	AIC	under	affective	context	or	situation,	and	subsequently,	a	failure	to	represent	important	bodily	states	within	the	insula	(Silani	et	al.,	2008;	Singer	&	Lamm,	2009).		Because	the	ACC	and	AIC	commonly	co-activate	(see	Gu	et	al.,	2013),	it	has	been	difficult	to	parse	their	specific	contributions	to	the	alexithymia	construct.		Hogeveen	and	colleagues	(2016)	present	compelling	evidence	bringing	the	AIC	to	the	forefront.		They	measured	alexithymia	in	Vietnam	war	veterans	who	sustained	varying	degrees	of	AIC	damage	following	penetrating	brain	injuries	and	showed	that	severity	of	AIC	damage	
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predicted	alexithymia,	or	resulted	in	“acquired	alexithymia.”	This	relation	occurred	independently	of	ACC	activation.	
Behavioral	abnormalities	in	alexithymia.		Since	the	advent	of	the	TAS-20,	the	field	has	burgeoned	with	laboratory-based	studies	exploring	behavioral	abnormalities	in	alexithymia	across	myriad	fields	of	psychology	and	neuroscience.		These	studies	are	critical	for	understanding	exactly	how	alexithymia	alters	one’s	emotional	experiences,	though	still,	there	are	many	inconsistencies	and	much	is	still	unknown.		Findings	related	to	physiological	arousal	serve	as	a	good	example	of	inconsistencies	in	the	field,	as	results	are	mixed.		In	response	to	emotional	stimuli,	a	good	deal	of	evidence	suggests	alexithymia	is	associated	with	physiological	hypoarousal	(e.g.,	Constantinou	et	al.,	2014;	Pollatos,	Schubö,	Herbert,	Matthias	&	Schandry,	2008;	Roedema	&	Simons,	1999),	hyperarousal	(Infrasca,	1997;	Stone	&	Nielson	2001),	while	other	studies	demonstrate	no	differences	in	arousal	levels	(Bausch	et	al.,	2001;	Eastabrook,	Lanteigne	&	Hollenstein,	2013;	Friedlander,	Lumley,	Farchione,	&	Doval,	1997).	Similar	inconsistencies	limit	conclusions	about	how	alexithymia	alters	subjective	report	of	arousal	(Peasley-Miklus	et	al.,	2015,	Roedema	&	Simons	1999).		More	consistent	are	findings	comparing	self-report	and	physiological	arousal,	which	consistently	demonstrate	disparity	in	responses	(e.g.,	Constantinou		et	al.,	2014;	Franz,	Schaefer,	Schneider,	Sitte	&	Bachor,	2003;	Pollatos	et	al.,	2011;	Stone	and	Nielson,	2001;	Vanman,	Dawson	&	Brennan,	1998).			Research	addressing	evaluation	of	valence	in	alexithymia	is	also	inconsistent,	with	some	demonstrating	intact	evaluation	of	valence	(McDonald	&	Prkachin,	1990;	Roedema	&	Simons,	1999;	Whemer,	Brejnak,	Lumley	&	Stettner,	1994)	and	others	showing	deficits	(Koven,	2014;	Vanman,	Dawson	&	Brennan,	1998).		A	similar	pattern	emerges	with	regards	
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to	intensity	ratings.		Where	some	report	no	effect	of	alexithymia	on	intensity	ratings	(Koven,	2014;	Fantini-Hauwel,	Luminet,	&	Vermeulen,	2015	[in	women]),	others	report	decreased	intensity	ratings	in	response	to	sad	stimuli	(Mantani,	Okamoto,	Shirao	Okada	Yamawaki.	2005)	and	others	report	increased	intensity	ratings	(Fantini-Hauwel	et	al.,	2015	[in	men];	Lee	and	Guajardo,	2011).		Following	emotion	induction,	some	studies	show	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	generation	of	emotion	words	to	describe	the	experience	(Luminet,	Rimé,	Bagby	&	Taylor,	2004;	Páez,	Velasco	&	González,	1999;	Roedema	&	Simons,	1999)	while	others	suggest	this	ability	may	be	intact	(Constantinous	et	al.	2014).			Alexithymia	is	consistently	associated	with	reduced	facial	emotion	recognition	(e.g.,	Brewer,	Collins,	Cook	&	Bird,	2015;	Nook,	Lindquist	&	Zaki,	2015;	Prkachin,	Casey	&	Prkachin,	2009)	and	abnormal	early	processing	of	emotional	body	postures	(Borhani,	Borgomaneri,	Làdavas,	&	Bertini,	2016).		Interestingly,	Nook	et	al.	(2015)	ameliorated	deficits	in	facial	emotion	recognition	in	alexithymia	by	providing	emotion	word	labels.		They	conclude	emotion	labels	facilitate	access	to	conceptual	knowledge	about	emotions	and	normalize	behavior.	
Response	Time.	Response	time	is	a	valuable	measure	of	emotional	processing	(Fazio,	1990);	as	an	indirect	measure,	it	is	generally	unbiased	by	demand	characteristics	(Lischetzke,	Cuccodoro,	Gauger,	Todeschini	&	Eid,	2005).		Findings	on	response	time	in	alexithymia	are	limited	and	mixed.	Ihme	et	al.	(2014)	show	that	observer-rated	(but	not	self-report)	alexithymia	was	associated	with	slower	response	time	for	identifying	negative	affect	in	a	facial	recognition	task.			Other	studies	report	no	relationship	between	response	
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time	and	alexithymia	during	retrieval	of	emotional	memories	(Lundh,	Johnsson,	Sundqvist	&	Olsson,	2002)	or	recall	of	emotional	words	(Luminet	et	al.,	2006).			Lischetzke	et	al.	(2005)	show	that	faster	response	time	may	be	adaptive;	individuals	respond	faster	to	affective	questions	about	which	they	are	more	certain.		They	use	response	time	as	a	measure	of	“emotional	clarity,”	or	an	individual’s	meta-knowledge	of	his	or	her	own	affective	state	(Boden	et	al.,	2013).		Taylor	(2004)	argues	emotional	clarity	is	a	core	dimension	of	alexithymia.	Faster	response	time	to	mood	questions	in	the	laboratory	is	associated	with	greater	daily	mood	regulation,	measured	using	experience	sampling	method	(Lischetzke,	Angelova	&	Eid,	2011),	though	slower	response	time	can	reflect	the	presence	of	mixed	affect	(i.e.,	presence	of	both	pleasant	and	unpleasant	experiences;	Lischetzke	et	al.,	2005).		
Emotional	complexity	in	alexithymia.		Emotional	complexity	is	a	multidimensional	construct	(see	Grühn,	Kotter-Grühn,	&	Röcke,	2010;	Grühn,	Lumley,	Diehl,	&	Labouvie-Vief,	2013)	that	captures	a	wide	range	of	emotional	experiences,	including	alexithymia.		Constructs	within	include	precision	of	one’s	emotional	experience,	explicit	knowledge	of	emotional	experiences,	and	an	individual’s	perspective	on	their	own	degree	of	complexity	(Lindquist	and	Barrett,	2008).		Despite	the	relevance	of	emotional	complexity	to	alexithymia,	little	research	has	examined	their	overlap.	Emotion	granularity	(also	referred	to	as	emotion	differentiation),	for	example,	refers	to	the	ability	to	make	fine-grained	distinctions	between	emotional	experiences.		Individuals	with	a	high	degree	of	granularity	use	precise	vocabulary	to	capture	the	nuances	of	diverse	emotional	experiences	(Barrett,	1998;	Barrett,	Gross,	Christensen,	&	Benvenuto,	2001;	Tugade,	Fredrickson	&	Barrett,	2007).		High	granularity	is	associated	with	increased	
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well-being	and	psychological	health	(Erbas,	Ceulemans,	Pe,	Koval	&	Kuppens,	2014;	Kashdan,	Barrett	&	McKnight,	2015).		Better	emotion	granularity	may	promote	cognitive	distancing	in	response	to	distressing	feelings	and	bodily	sensations	(Kashdan	et	al.,	2015),	facilitating	effective	emotion	regulation	and	allocation	of	resources	towards	pursuit	of	values.		A	proposed	pathway	by	which	granularity	interrupts	adaptive	emotion	regulation	is	depicted	in	Figure	2.	
	
Figure	2.		Proposed	pathway	by	which	emotion	granularity	facilitates	regulation	of	negative	affect,	pursuit	of	values	and	ultimately,	wellbeing.		From	Kashdan	et	al.,	2015.		Emotion	granularity	is	quantified	as	an	average	inter-correlations	between	emotion	words	endorsed	on	Likert	scales,	either	throughout	the	day	in	experiencing	sampling	methods	(e.g.,	Barrett	et	al.,	2001;	Kashdan	&	Farmer,	2014),	or	in	the	laboratory(e.g.,	Boden,	Thompson,	Dizén,	Berenbaum	&	Baker,	2013;	Erbas	et	al.,	2014).	Smaller	correlations	indicate	increased	granularity.	Like	emotional	awareness,	granularity	is	associated	with	improved	emotion	regulation,	especially	negative	granularity	(Barrett	et	al.,	2001;	Demiralp	et	al.,	2012;	see	Tugade	&	Fredrickson,	2007	for	benefits	of	positive	granularity).		Similar	to	the	alexithymia	construct,	low	emotion	granularity	is	associated	
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with	major	depressive	disorder	(Demiralp	et	al.,	2012)	and	depressive	symptoms	in	a	non-clinical	sample	(Erbas	et	al.,	2014).		It	is	associated	with	disorders	marked	by	difficulty	regulating	emotions,	including	eating	disorders	(Selby	et	al.,	2013),	borderline	personality	disorder	(Suvak	et	al.,	2011),	aggression	(Pond	et	al.,	2012)	and	alcohol	use	(Kashdan,	Ferssizidis,	Collins	&	Muraven	et	al.,	2010).		It	is	also	present	in	schizophrenia	(Kimhy	et	al.,	2014)	and	autism	spectrum	disorders	(Erbas,	Ceulemans,	Boonen,	Noens,	&	Kuppens,	2013).	Erbas	et	al.	(2014)	show	that	alexithymia,	particularly	the	DIF	and	DDF	subscales	of	TAS-20,	are	associated	with	reduced	negative	granularity.		Based	on	their	degree	of	relatedness,	they	conclude	that	though	the	two	overlap,	they	represent	distinct	emotional	constructs.		Kashdan	et	al.	(2015)	explain	that	following	intense	negative	affect,	a	period	of	emotion	differentiation	emerges	which	launches	subsequent	emotion	regulation.		A	lack	of	emotional	awareness	(i.e.,	alexithymia)	may	limit	the	process	of	differentiating	an	affective	experience.		Another	aspect	of	emotional	complexity,	dialecticism,	refers	to	one’s	tendency	to	simultaneously	experience	pleasant	and	unpleasant	states	(Bagozzi,	Wong,	&	Yi,	1999).			Dialecticism	is	a	core	concept	of	dialectical	behavioral	therapy	(DBT;	Linehan,	1993),	in	which	participants	are	encouraged	to	synthesize	opposites	(e.g.,	“acceptance”	and	“change”).		DBT	has	been	successful	in	improving	clinical	outcomes	in	borderline	personality	disorder	(Panos,	Jackson,	Hasan	&	Panos,	2013),	with	growing	evidence	for	its	efficacy	treating	other	disorders	(Öst,	2008).		Compared	to	emotional	granularity,	much	less	work	has	investigated	the	psychological	correlates	of	dialecticism	alone,	though	some	evidence	suggests	dialecticism	promotes	stress	reduction	and	emotion	regulation	(Davis,	
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Zautra,	&	Smith,	2004;	Ong	&	Bergeman	2004;	Reich,	Zautra,	&		Davis,	2003).		Both	granularity	and	dialecticism	increase	across	the	lifespan	(Carstensen,	Pasupathi,	Mayr	&	Nesselroade,	2000;	Widen	&	Russell,	2008).	
Interoceptive	Awareness	and	Alexithymia	Deficits	in	interoception	are	thought	to	reflect	a	core	component	of	alexithymia	(Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Herbert	&	Pollatos,	2012;	Herbert	et	al.,	2011).		Interoception	refers	to	afferent	information	that	arises	from	within	the	body	that	affects	the	cognition	or	behavior	of	an	organism	(Cameron,	2001;	Craig,	2002);	an	individual’s	metacognitive	awareness	of	interoceptive	signals	in	considered	“interoceptive	awareness.”	An	individual’s	ability	to	accurately	detect	these	signals	is	considered	“interoceptive	accuracy”	(see	Garfinkel	&	Critchley,	2013;	Garfinkel,	Seth,	Barrett,	Suzuki	&	Critchely,	2015).		Awareness	of	one’s	bodily	cues	is	critical	for	formulation	of	a	sense	of	self	(Craig,	2002;	Damasio,	2003),	for	formulation	of	embodied	emotional	concepts	(Herbert	&	Pollatos,	2012)	and	the	generation	of	subjective	emotional	states	(Damasio,	2003).		 Interoceptive	awareness	is	measured	using	a	variety	of	behavioral	tasks,	the	most	common	of	which	are	heartbeat	detection	tasks.		In	Schandry’s	(1981)	heartbeat	tracking	task,	participants	are	asked	to	estimate	how	many	times	their	heart	beats	in	a	given	period	of	time.		This	estimation	is	compared	to	objective	measures	of	heart	rate.		Similarly,	in	the	heartbeat	discrimination	task,	participants	are	presented	with	tapping	noises	and	asked	whether	noises	are	synchronous	or	asynchronous	with	their	own	heartbeat	(Whitehead,	Dresher,	Heiman,	&	Blackwell,	1977).		Others	rely	on	neuroimaging	data	from	the	“interoceptive	cortex”	(Craig,	2009;	Critchley	et	al.,	2004)	to	quantify	measures	of	interoceptive	awareness.		Others	rely	on	response	time	to	questions	about	physiological	
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state	as	an	index	of	interoceptive	accuracy	(Silverstein,	Brown,	Roth	&	Britton,	2011),	though	little	evidence	supports	this	approach.		Alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	interoceptive	accuracy	on	the	heartbeat	tracking	test	(Herbert	et	al.,	2011;	Shah,	Hall,	Catmur,	&	Bird,	in	press)	and	shows	abnormal	activation	in	and	structure	of	the	interoceptive	cortex	(Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Frewen	et	al.	2006;	Ihme	et	al.,	2013;		Kano	et	al.	2003;	Kano	et	al.	2007;	Karlsson	et	al.	2008;	Reker	et	al.,	2010;	Silani	et	al.,	2008;		Strigo	et	al.,	2013).		Because	of	the	vast	overlap	between	interoceptive	awareness	and	alexithymia,	and	because	interoceptive	awareness	is	considered	critical	in	the	generation	of	subjective	emotional	experiences	(Damasio,	2003),	some	argue	that	interoceptive	deficits	are	a	precursor	to	the	development	of	alexithymia	(Herbert	et	al.,	2011)	or	that	alexithymia	is	best	characterized	as	an	interoceptive	deficit	(Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Herbert	&	Pollatos,	2012;	Silani	et	al.,	2008).			 Like	alexithymia,	interoceptive	awareness	is	responsive	to	intervention.		A	good	deal	of	evidence	shows	that	long-term	mindfulness	meditation	training	results	in	neural	changes	suggesting	enhanced	interoceptive	awareness	(Farb	et	al.,	2010;	Farb,	Segal,	&	Anderson,	2013;	Hölzel	et	al.,	2008;	Hölzel	et	al.	2011;	Lazar	et	al.,	2005).		Laboratory-based	studies	also	show	that	feedback	about	one’s	heart	rate	improves	accuracy	(Schandry	&	Weitkunat,	1990),	as	does	the	presence	of	self-referential	stimuli	in	the	testing	room	(e.g.,	a	mirror;	Ainley,	Maister,	Brokfeld,	&	Tsakiris,	2013;	Ainley,	Tajadura-Jiménez,	Fotopoulou,	&	Tsakiris,	2012).	
Current	Study		 The	major	aim	of	this	project	was	to	develop	a	laboratory-based	task	to	facilitate	measurement	of	a	wide	range	of	emotional	experiences	in	alexithymia.		Though	
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overlapping,	emotion	constructs	are	distinct,	and	collecting	multiple	measurements	in	the	same	study	offers	importance	nuances	(Grühn	et	al.,	2013).		In	the	paradigm,	participants	view	video	clips	designed	to	elicit	a	particular	emotional	state,	and	asked	a	series	of	questions	about	their	emotional	experiences.		From	these	questions	measures	of	subjective	emotional	experience	(i.e.,	labeling	primary	emotional	experience,	subjective	arousal,	subjective	intensity),	implicit	measures	of	emotional	experience	(i.e.,	response	time)	and	aspects	of	emotional	complexity	(i.e.,	granularity	and	dialecticism)	will	be	collected.		Many	of	these	measures	have	been	minimally	studied	in	alexithymia,	and	hold	promise	for	further	elucidating	the	construct.				 This	paradigm	will	address	the	hypothesis	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	abnormal	emotional	concepts,	or	access	to	such	concepts.		Participants	will	be	asked	to	identify	their	primary	emotional	experience,	with	the	option	of	selecting	“I	experienced	no	emotion.”		This	question	will	provide	insight	into	the	use	of	conceptual	emotional	information	in	alexithymia.	If	alexithymia	is	associated	with	impoverished	conceptual	knowledge	about	emotional	states,	it	may	be	associated	with	selecting	a	greater	variety	of	emotional	experiences	as	primary,	or	endorsing	incongruent	emotion	words.		If	alexithymia	is	associated	with	an	abnormally	high	threshold	by	which	physiological	and	subjective	cues	about	emotional	experience	enter	consciousness,	I	hypothesize	the	construct	will	be	associated	with	greater	selection	of	“no	emotion”	as	primary	emotional	experience.		Inconsistencies	of	past	research	suggest	that	experimental	design	and	demand	characteristics	could	confer	heavy	influence	on	measures	of	subjective	experience	including	arousal	or	intensity	ratings	(see	Helmes,	McNeill,	Holden	&	Jackson,	2008	for	
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discussion	of	social	desirability	in	alexithymia).		These	inconsistencies	preclude	specific	hypotheses,	though	in	general,	I	expect	alexithymia	to	be	associated	with	abnormal	patterns	of	responding	on	subjective	measures	and	that	different	behavioral	patterns	will	emerge	for	different	alexithymia	subscales.	I	expect	alexithymia	will	show	more	consistent	deficits	in	measures	of	emotional	complexity,	which	reflect	mature	developmental	processes	(Carstensen	et	al.,	2000;	Widen	&	Russell,	2008)	as	well	as	implicit	measures,	which	may	be	less	vulnerable	to	experimental	parameters	and	more	difficult	to	manipulate.	Specifically,	I	expect	alexithymia	will	be	associated	with	reduced	granularity	and	dialecticism	of	emotional	experience.		I	hypothesize	alexithymia	will	be	associated	with	either	faster	or	slower	response	time;	decreased	response	time	would	indicate	reduced	emotional	clarity	(Lischetzke	et	al.,	2005),	though	increased	response	time	may	reflect	reduced	mixed-emotion	or	reduced	time	contemplating	emotional	states.		 A	second	goal	of	this	project	was	to	examine	how	interoceptive	awareness	interacts	with	emotional	correlates	of	alexithymia	and	to	investigate	the	effects	of	mindfulness	meditation	on	improving	deficits	in	alexithymia.	Participants	will	be	randomly	assigned	to	receive	either	a	brief	mindfulness	meditation	or	control	recording.		Before	and	after,	they	will	complete	measures	of	interoceptive	accuracy.		Mindfulness	practices	encourage	individuals	to	attend	to	present-focused	internal	experiences,	such	as	bodily	sensations,	thoughts,	and	emotions	(Kabat-Zinn,	1990).		As	a	therapeutic	tool,	mindfulness	involves	cultivating	a	nonjudgmental	awareness	of	the	present	moment.			Cross-sectional	evidence	supports	a	negative	correlation	between	mindfulness	and	alexithymia	(e.g.,	Baer,	Smith,	&	Allen,	2004;	Bruin,	Topper,	Muskens,	Bögels,	&	Kamphuis,	
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2012).		Mindfulness	meditation	enhances	interoceptive	awareness:	Far,	Segal	&	Anderson	(2013)	show	that	an	8-week	mindfulness	protocol	(Mindfulness	Based	Stress	Reduction;	Kabat-Zinn,	1990)	increases	activity	in	the	interoceptive	cortex	compared	to	wait-list	controls.		Long-term	meditators	also	show	greater	activation	of	the	interoceptive	cortex	compared	to	non-meditating	controls	(Hölzel	et	al.,	2008;	Lazar	et	al.,	2005).		Mindfulness	interventions	may	also	have	the	potential	to	reduce	alexithymia	levels.		Experiment	two	will	examine	how	mindfulness	meditation	affects	performance	of	major	task	variables,	and	whether	alexithymia	moderates	or	interacts	with	these	effects.		I	expect	to	replicate	previous	findings	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	interoceptive	accuracy.		Based	on	the	theory	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	intact	ability	to	attend	to	internal	stimuli	but	reduced	tendency	to	do	so	(Panayiotou	et	al.,	2015),	I	expect	mindfulness	meditation	will	improve	interoceptive	accuracy	in	alexithymia.		I	hypothesize	mindfulness	meditation	will	result	in	increases	in	measures	of	emotional	complexity,	particularly	as	mindfulness	is	used	as	a	tool	to	promote	dialectical	thinking	(Linehan,	1993).		If	mindfulness	meditation	is	effective	for	normalizing	this	and	other	emotional	experiences,	I	expect	alexithymia	will	be	associated	with	improvements	in	performance	in	the	meditation	condition.		It	may	also	be	the	case	that	mindfulness	is	not	an	efficacious	intervention	approach	for	those	with	elevated	alexithymia,	in	which	deficits	in	emotional	processing	may	remain	the	same,	or	improve	minimally	in	contrast	to	those	with	low	alexithymia.	Through	the	development	of	a	novel	laboratory-based	design	to	assess	behavioral	correlates	of	alexithymia,	the	current	study	will	facilitate	measurement	of	a	range	of	subjective,	implicit,	and	complex	emotional	experiences,	further	delineating	the	nature	of	
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emotional	processing	deficits	in	alexithymia.		Experiment	two	will	examine	how	these	measures	relate	to	interoceptive	accuracy,	and	whether	they	are	responsive	to	a	brief	mindfulness	meditation	intervention.		By	collecting	a	range	of	emotional	experiences,	this	paradigm	will	serve	as	a	platform	for	future	development	of	a	laboratory-based	assessment	of	alexithymia.		 	
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CHAPTER	II	
	
Experiment	1:	Delineating	emotional	processing	abnormalities	in	alexithymia	
through	a	novel	laboratory-based	design	
	Aims	1) To	determine	whether	alexithymia	influences	normative	selection	of	emotion	labels	following	well-validated	emotion	induction	film	clips.	2) To	assess	how	alexithymia	relates	to	measures	of	subjective	emotional	processing.	3) To	investigate	the	role	of	emotional	granularity	and	dialecticism	in	alexithymia.	4) To	measures	response	time	as	an	implicit	measure	of	emotional	processing	in	alexithymia.	5) To	develop	a	versatile	laboratory-based	task	that	can	easily	be	used	to	measure	behavioral	correlates	of	alexithymia	in	the	future.	
Method	
Participants	113	undergraduates	(68%	women)	were	recruited	and	received	course	credit	for	their	participation.	Exclusion	criteria	were	a	past	or	current	diagnosis	of	depression,	anxiety,	or	substance	use	disorder.		Data	were	excluded	from	two	participants	for	not	following	instructions,	and	three	participants	due	to	equipment	problems.		Of	the	remaining	participants,	the	average	age	was	19.31	(standard	deviation	=	0.89).		50%	identified	as	Caucasian,	24%	Asian	American	or	Asian,	14%	African	American	or	African,	2%	Hispanic,	8%	as	“Multiracial,”	and	2%	as	“other.”		Written	informed	consent	was	
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obtained	from	all	participants,	as	approved	by	the	Vanderbilt	Institutional	Review	Board	(IRB).	
Materials	
Apparatus and stimuli.	Questionnaires	and	stimuli	were	presented	via	Eprime	2.0	using	a	15”	X	10”	inch	laptop	with	a	black	background	in	a	darkened	room.	Participants	wore	Audio-Technica	noise	cancelling	headphones	through	the	video	portion	of	the	experiment.		Stimuli	included	the	14	film	clips	identified	as	reliably	eliciting	one	of	7	prototypical	emotions	(amusement,	anger,	contentment,	disgust,	fear,	sadness,	and	surprise);	there	were	two	clips	for	each	emotion	category	(Gross	&	Levenson,	1995;	see	Appendix	A	for	details).		Participants	also	viewed	one	video	from	the	same	battery	designed	to	induce	a	“neutral”	state	during	inter	trial	intervals.	Participants	were	given	one	practice	trial	during	which	they	viewed	a	non-standardized	film	clip	from	the	movie	
Zoolander.	
Questionnaires.		Participants	completed	the	Toronto	Alexithymia	Scale	(TAS-20;	Bagby,	et	al.,	1994).	This	scale	consists	of	20	items	and	measures	three	dimensions	of	the	alexithymia	construct:	difficulty	identifying	feelings	(DIF),	difficulty	describing	feelings	(DDF),	and	externally-	oriented	thinking	(EOT).	Participants	rate	to	what	extent	they	agree	with	statements	using	a	five-point	Likert	scale.	Cronbach’s	alpha	was	0.64	in	the	present	study.	Participants	were	also	asked	to	report	the	intensity	with	with	they	experienced	primary	and	secondary	emotions	on	a	1-9	Likert	scale,	as	well	as	subjective	arousal	using	a	1-9	self-assessment	manikin	scale	(SAM;	Bradley	&	Lang,	1994).			
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Design	and	Procedure		
		 After	written	informed	consent	was	obtained,	participants	completed	a	demographic	form	and	questionnaire	battery.	They	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	two	counterbalanced	run	orders.		In	both,	positive	and	negative	emotion	eliciting	videos	were	evenly	distributed.		They	received	instructions	for	the	task	and	were	asked	to	read	aloud	a	list	of	relevant	emotion	words	to	ensure	familiarity	(see	Appendix	B).		While	the	experimenter	was	present,	they	completed	a	full	practice	trial	during	and	after	which	they	were	given	opportunities	to	ask	questions.		Participants	then	completed	14	trials.		After	each	video,	participants	responded	to	a	series	of	questions	about	their	primary	and	secondary	emotional	experiences.	
Emotion	induction	task.		Primary	Emotion.		After	a	5s	“neutral”	film	clip,	participants	were	presented	with	one	of	fourteen	emotion	inducing	clips.		Afterwards,	they	were	asked	which	of	16	emotions	they	experienced	the	most	(amusement,	anger,	arousal,	confusion,	contempt,	contentment,	disgust,	embarrassment,	fear,	happiness,	interest,	pain,	relief,	sadness,	surprise,	and	tension),	replicating	Gross	and	Levenson’s	(1995)	original	design.		In	addition,	they	were	given	the	option	to	select:	“I	did	not	experience	any	emotion,”	and	“the	emotion	I	experienced	is	not	listed	here.”	A	“target	emotion”	variable	was	formed	reflecting	the	percentage	of	times	a	normative	emotional	response	was	selected,	based	on	intended	induction	as	well	as	a	few	exceptions	outlined	in	Gross	and	Levenson’s	(1995)	original	paper	(see	Appendix	A).		Next,	participants	were	asked	to	report	the	intensity	of	their	primary	emotion	and	subjective	arousal.		Response	times	were	collected	for	all	responses.		Response	time	was	defined	as	the	duration	between	stimulus	onset	to	participant	response.		This	portion	of	the	experiment	is	visually	depicted	in	Figure	
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3	and	a	summary	of	these	variables	and	all	other	task	variables	are	summarized	in	Appendix	C.	
Figure	3.		A	trial	of	the	primary	emotion	portion	of	the	experiment	and	variable	labels.		
Note.	Text	here	is	abbreviated.		
Secondary	Emotions.	Next,	participants	were	presented	with	a	serial	list	of	29	additional	emotion	words	and	asked	how	much	they	experienced	each	on	a	scale	of	1-9,	on	which	1	indicated	“I	did	not	experience	this	emotion	at	all.”		These	included	the	16	emotion	words	described	above,	non-overlapping	words	from	the	Positive	and	Negative	Affect	Scales	(PANAS;	Watson,	Clark	&	Tellegen,1988)	and	two	additional	words	added	after	piloting	the	experiment	(calm,	pity).		Words	are	summarized	in	Appendix	B.		Emotions	rated	>1	were	considered	a	positive	endorsement	of	that	emotion.		From	secondary	emotion	responses,	variables	were	created	for	intensity	of	secondary	emotions	and	total	secondary	emotions	endorsed.	At	the	end	of	each	trial,	participants	were	asked	to	indicate	whether	they	had	seen	the	film	previously.		They	were	asked	to	press	a	space	bar	to	begin	the	next	trial.		The	secondary	emotion	portion	of	the	experiment	is	depicted	in	Figure	4.	
Subjective	Arousal	
												Subjective	Arousal	RT	
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Figure	4.		An	abbreviated	trial	of	the	secondary	emotion	portion	of	the	experiment	and	variable	labels.		Note:	In	actuality,	29	different	words	are	presented	to	participants;	Text	here	is	abbreviated.		 The	secondary	emotions	portion	of	this	experiment	is	used	to	calculate	measures	of	emotional	complexity,	including	granularity	and	dialecticism.		Erbas	et	al.	(2014)	showed	a	negative	relationship	between	alexithymia	and	negative	granularity.		The	current	study	expands	these	findings	by	assessing	positive	granularity,	and	by	using	more	complex	and	intense	emotional	stimuli	(video	clips	versus	static	images	and	names	of	friends	and	family);	this	is	an	important	step,	as	simple	cues	may	be	more	likely	to	tap	into	rudimentary	knowledge	of	emotional	concepts,	facilitating	normative	self-report	(Lindquist	&	Barrett,	2008). 
Data	Analyses	
Missing	and	outlying	data.	Because	of	technical	errors	that	caused	the	task	program	to	fail,	.007%	of	performance	data	points	were	missing.		Eight	participants	were	
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missing	data	from	one	of	fourteen	emotion	induction	trials;	in	this	case,	data	from	an	induction	congruent	trial	was	used	as	a	proxy	to	calculate	overall	aggregate	variables.		A	ninth	participant	was	missing	data	from	both	surprise	induction	trials;	in	this	case,	overall	mean	data	from	other	trials	was	imputed	for	surprise	trials.		Response	time	variables	were	influenced	by	outliers.	To	address	this,	outliers	were	defined	as	data	points	6	SDs	greater	than	the	mean,	and	were	winsorized	(Ghosh	&	Vogt,	2012).	A	total	of	.003%	of	these	variables	were	adjusted.		After	adjustment,	all	task	variables	met	assumptions	of	linear	regression	(Tabachnick	&	Fidell,	2007).	
Elastic	net	regression	models.	To	explore	secondary	emotional	variables,	elastic	net	regression	was	employed.		This	approach	is	a	form	of	automatic	variable	selection,	used	to	identify	predictive	variables	within	large	data	sets	while	utilizing	shrinkage	estimates	to	reduce	predictive	errors	and	avoid	overfitting.	An	extension	of	ridge	regression	(Hoerl	and	Kennard,	1988)	and	least	absolute	shrinkage	and	selection	operator	(LASSO;	Tibshirani,	1996),	Zou	and	Hastie	(2005)	developed	the	elastic	net	approach	to	better	accommodate	data	sets	in	which	predictors	outweigh	number	of	participants.	Elastic	net	combines	the	penalties	applied	in	ridge	and	LASSO	regression,	facilitating	variable	selection	by	shrinking	non-relevant	regression	coefficients	to	0	and	grouping	similar	variables,	allowing	collinear	variables	in	the	same	model.			 This	approach	is	ideal	for	examining	variables	in	the	secondary	emotion	condition.		This	condition	yielded	a	large	number	of	response	variables	(RTs	and	intensity	ratings	for	29	emotion	words	across	14	inductions).		Though	some	permeations	are	collapsed	and	presented	in	ordinary	least	squares	analysis	in	the	present	study,	elastic	net	is	used	as	an	exploratory	supplement	facilitating	consideration	of	specific	secondary	emotion	words.		
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Eventually,	this	information	can	be	used	to	develop	a	more	parsimonious	version	of	the	task	presented,	as	well	as	guide	interpretation	of	relevant	themes	present	in	alexithymia.	
Results	
Descriptive	
		 Mean	TAS-20	was	45.75	(SD	=	8.51).		Mean	DDF	score	was	12.42	(SD	=	2.30);	DIF	was	14.71	(SD	=	4.00);	and	EOT	was	18.62	(SD	=	3.70).		
Task	Performance.	Means	and	standard	deviations	by	emotion	category	for	main	performance	variables	are	depicted	in	Table	1	and	response	time	variables	in	Table	2.		Repeated-measures	analysis	of	variance	(ANOVA)	was	used	to	test	the	effect	of	emotion	category	(amusement,	anger,	contentment,	disgust,	fear,	sadness,	surprise).		As	expected	based	on	Gross	and	Levenson’s	(1995)	findings,	emotion	category	had	a	significant	effect	on	all	performance	variables.		There	were	no	significant	category	by	TAS-20	interactions	on	performance.		Results	presented	in	Table	1.			 	
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		 Target	Emotion	 	Primary						Intensity	 Subjective	Arousal	 Secondary	Intensity	 Total	Secondary	Emotions	Amusement	 0.77	(.31)	 5.85	(1.49)	 4.62	(1.75)	 1.94	(.52)	 8.94	(4.74)	Anger	 0.47	(.35)	 5.62	(1.73)	 5.21	(1.64)	 2.90	(.87)	 15.21	(5.25)	Contentment	 0.36	(.41)	 3.40	(1.93)	 1.88	(1.65)	 1.55	(.50)	 5.41	(4.14)	Disgust	 0.72	(.31)	 6.06	(1.97)	 5.05	(1.67)	 2.00	(.63)	 9.44	(4.55)	Fear	 0.89	(.22)	 4.55	(1.87)	 5.18	(1.77)	 2.11	(.57)	 11.82	(4.70)	Sadness	 0.91	(.24)	 6.00	(1.67)	 4.67	(1.57)	 2.23	(.67)	 13.34	(4.67)	Surprise	 0.52	(.35)	 4.65(1.73)	 4.54	(1.69)	 1.88	(.58)	 10.92	(4.57)	
F(6,42)	 53.73***	 64.98***	 83.48***	 152.19***	 185.04***	
Table	1.		Descriptive	performance	data	for	videos	based	on	emotion	induction	category.		F	values	depict	effect	of	emotion	category	on	performance.		Note.	***p	<	.001		ANOVA	analyses	also	revealed	significant	main	effect	of	emotion	category	on	all	response	time	variables	as	well.		Means,	standard	deviations,	and	F	statistics	reported	in	Table	2.		There	were	no	significant	group	by	alexithymia	interactions	on	performance	variables.		Because	of	the	lack	of	interactions	between	TAS-20	and	emotion	category	for	performance	and	RT	variables,	emotion	categories	were	collapsed	for	all	future	analyses.		 		 Target	Emotion	RT	 Primary	Intensity	RT	 Subjective	Arousal	RT	 Secondary	Intensity	RT	Amusement	 6.49	(.34)	 9.81	(.58)	 7.07	(.31)	 1.40	(.44)	Anger	 10.13	(.58)	 17.04	(.12)	 6.87	(.30)	 1.69	(.50)	Contentment	 13.9	(.91)	 13.69	(.85)	 8.21	(.33)	 1.11	(.44)	Disgust	 6.44	(.34)	 7.74	(.46)	 6.91	(.30)	 1.37	(.41)	Fear	 9.18	(.45)	 13.39	(.72)	 9.67	(.57)	 1.63	(.49)	Sadness	 6.33	(.40)	 9.79	(.58)	 7.86	(.38)	 1.60	(.46)	Surprise	 9.34	(.51)	 14.12	(.83)	 10.38	(.58)	 1.47	(.43)	
F(6,	42)	 32.35***	 20.96***	 15.71***	 78.70***	
Table	2.		Descriptive	response	time	data	for	videos	based	on	emotion	induction	category.		F	values	depict	effect	of	emotion	category	on	performance.	Note.	***p	<	.001;	RT	=	response	time.		
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Validating	Findings	Patterns	of	responding	are	consistent	with	original	findings	of	Gross	and	Levenson	(1995).		There	is	a	deviation	in	target	emotion	for	the	disgust	video	depicting	an	arm	amputation:	in	the	original	study,	80%	of	participants	identified	disgust	as	their	primary	emotion	following	this	video,	and	only	57%	chose	so	in	the	current	study.		A	greater	proportion	(24%)	selected	“interest”	as	primary,	possibly	reflecting	high	proportion	of	pre-medical	students	in	Vanderbilt	undergrad	psychology	courses.		Also	unlike	original	findings	in	other	studies,	there	was	no	relationship	between	intensity	and	previous	experience	with	videos	(ps	>	.35).			
Relationship	between	performance	variables	Spearman	correlations	between	major	task	variables	are	presented	in	Table	3.		All	RT	variables	were	strongly	and	positively	inter-correlated.	Secondary	intensity	was	correlated	with	primary	intensity	RT.		Primary	and	secondary	intensity	were	positive	correlated	with	secondary	intensity	RT.		Finally,	primary	and	secondary	intensity	were	positively	correlated	with	subjective	arousal.		There	were	no	gender	differences	in	performance	with	the	exception	of	a	statistical	trend	between	males	(mean=	9.33s,	sd	=	2.22)	and	females	(mean	=	8.44s,	sd	=	2.61	)	for	target	emotion	RT;	it	took	males	longer	to	identify	primary	emotional	experience	(t(108)=1.73,	p<.10).		 	
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		 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	1.	Target	emotion	 -0.15	 -0.12	 0.05	 0.01	 -0.06	 0.00	 0.07	2.	Primary	intensity	 		 -0.43**	 0.64***	 0.12	 -0.15	 0.00	 0.23*	3.	Subjective	arousal	 		 		 0.33***	 0.02	 0.03	 0.06	 1.30	4.	Secondary	intensity	 		 		 		 0.00	 -.21*	 -0.04	 0.36***	5.	Target	emotion	RT	 		 		 		 		 0.55***	 0.42***	 0.51***	6.	Primary	intensity	RT	 		 		 		 		 		 0.50***	 0.53***	7.	Subjective	arousal	RT	 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.55***	8.	Secondary	intensity	RT	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Table	3.		Spearman	correlations	between	major	task	variables.;	*p	<	.05;	**p	<	.01.;	***p	<	.001		
Testing	interaction	of	TAS-20.		Where	there	were	significant	correlations	between	task	variables,	the	effect	of	TAS-20	total	score	was	assessed	using	Hayes’s	(2013)	PROCESS	macro	for	moderation.		No	significant	moderating	effects	of	TAS-20	total	emerged.		Thus,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	similar	patterns	of	emotional	processing.	
Relationship	between	TAS-20	and	performance	variables	
Overview	of	performance	variables.		Because	of	the	ordinal	nature	of	the	target	emotion	variable	and	total	secondary	words	endorsed,	spearman	correlations	were	employed	to	assess	overall	relationships	between	TAS-20	and	performance	variables.		Overall,	TAS-20	total	was	correlated	with	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	target	emotion	(ρ	=	-0.21,	p	<	.05)	and	reduced	subjective	arousal	(ρ	=	-0.23,	p	<	.05).		It	was	also	associated	with	faster	RTs	to	questions	about	intensity	of	primary	(ρ	=	-0.25,	p	<	.01)	and	secondary	(ρ	=	-0.28,	p	<	.01)	emotions.		Correlations	between	performance	variables	and	TAS-20	subscales	are	reported	in	Table	4.			 	
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		 TAS-20	Subscales		 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	Target	Emotion	 -0.17†	 -0.14	 -0.16†	Primary	Intensity	 -0.09	 -0.16	 -0.04	Subjective	Arousal	 -0.22*	 -0.12	 -0.19*	Secondary	Intensity	 -0.07	 -0.05	 -0.11	Total	Secondary	Words	 -0.04	 0.03	 -0.18†	Target	Emotion	RT	 -0.01	 -0.22*	 -0.05	Primary	Intensity	RT	 -0.12	 -0.26**	 -0.21*	Subjective	Arousal	RT	 -0.09	 -0.10	 -0.07	Secondary	Intensity	RT	 -0.13	 -0.25*	 -0.26**		Table	4.	Spearman	correlations	between	TAS-20	total	score	and	subscales.		Note.	†p	<	.10;	*p	<	.05;	**p	<	.01.			 DDF	was	associated	with	reduced	arousal	overall	and	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	target	emotion	at	the	trend	level.		DIF	was	negatively	associated	with	RT	variables	including:	identifying	primary	emotion	RT,	primary	intensity	and	secondary	intensity	RTs.	EOT	was	associated	with	reduced	arousal	and	faster	response	times	for	primary	and	secondary	emotional	intensity.		EOT	was	associated	with	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	and	endorsing	fewer	secondary	emotion	words	overall	at	the	trend	level.			Because	of	the	gender	difference	for	selecting	target	emotion	RT,	the	relationship	between	DIF	and	selecting	target	RT	was	re-run	controlling	for	gender.		The	relationship	remained	significant.		RT	variables	were	also	assessed	with	“no	emotion”	as	a	covariate,	as	selecting	“no	emotion”	might	have	prompted	participants	to	answer	subsequent	questions	without	contemplation,	skewing	RT.		All	relationships	remained	significant.		
Group	differences	in	selecting	target	emotion.		Participants	were	divided	into	high	(1	SD	above	the	mean,	54,	n	=	21)	and	low	(1	SD	below	the	mean,	37,	n	=	19)	TAS-20	
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scores	in	a	post	hoc	analysis	investigating	qualitative	differences	in	selecting	target	emotions,	to	better	understand	why	TAS-20	was	associated	with	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	(ρ	=	-.211,	p	<	.05).		Visual	inspection	suggested	similar	response	patterns,	with	the	majority	selecting	the	target	emotion	in	both	groups;	however,	it	seemed	visually	that	the	high	alexithymia	group	showed	a	greater	range	of	responses.		Indeed,	the	low	alexithymia	group	endorsed	on	average	fewer	non-target	primary	emotions	(2.86)	compared	to	the	high	alexithymia	group	(4.26;	(t(40)=-2.68,	p<.05).		Figure	5	depicts	an	example.		
	
Figure	5.		Example	of	variability	in	primary	emotions	selected	in	high	alexithymia.		This	figure	depicts	target	emotion	selected	following	a	disgust	induction,	in	which	a	woman	eats	her	dog’s	feces.		The	graph	on	the	left	represents	those	with	low	TAS-20	total	(1	SD	below	the	mean);	the	right	represents	those	with	high	TAS-20	total	(1	SD	above	the	mean).			 To	assess	patterns	in	selecting	primary	emotions,	11	t-tests	were	conducted	comparing	frequency	of	endorsing	non-target	primary	emotional	states	between	high	and	low	alexithymia,	depicted	in	Table	5.		The	high	alexithymia	group	was	associated	with	more	frequent	selection	of	“no	emotion”	(t	(40)	=	-2.92,	p	<	.001)	and	“confusion”	(t(40)	=	-2.03,	p	
Arousal
Disgust
AmusementConfusion
Contempt
Disgust
EmbarressmentNo	emotion
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<	.05)	as	primary	emotional	state.		To	better	understand	how	frequency	of	these	emotion	words	contributed	to	the	significant	correlation	between	TAS-20	total	score	and	target	emotion	(ρ	=	-.211,	p	<	.05),	a	composite	score	of	their	combined	frequencies	was	entered	into	a	partial	correlation	analysis.		With	introduction	of	the	composite	term,	the	significant	relationship	between	TAS-20	and	accuracy	became	non-significant	(ρ	=	-.07,	p	=	.48).				
	 		 Low	Alexithymia	 High	Alexithymia	 			 Mean	(SD)	 Mean	(SD)	 t	Arousal	 0.16	(.37)	 0.14	(.36)	 0.13	Confusion	 0.21	(.42)	 0.71	(1.01)	 -2.03*	Contempt	 0.11	(.32)	 0.29	(.56)	 -1.24	Embarrassment	 0.05	(.23)	 0.14	(.36)	 -0.94	Happiness	 0.21	(.42)	 0.38	(.50)	 -1.17	Interest	 0.68	(.95)	 0.67	(1.02)	 0.06	Pain	 0.05	(.23)	 0.05	(.22)	 0.07	Relief	 0.32	(.67)	 0.33	(.66)	 -0.08	Tension	 0.21	(.42)	 0.19	(.40)	 0.15	Not	Listed	 0.21	(.42)	 0.19	(.40)	 0.15	No	Emotion	 0.21	(.42)	 1.29	(1.55)	 -2.92**	
Table	5.	Group	differences	in	endorsing	non-target	primary	emotions.	Note:	“Not	Listed”	refers	to	the	item,	“the	emotion	I	selected	is	not	listed	here.”	*p	<	.05;	**p	<	.01.		 For	subsequent	analyses,	the	frequency	of	selecting	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	as	primary	emotional	experience	were	combined	into	a	“target	composite”	variable.	TAS-20	total	was	positively	correlated	with	target	composite	(ρ	=	-.30,	p	<	.01),	as	well	as	EOT	(ρ	=	-.31,	p	<	.001).		DDF	and	DIF	were	positively	correlated	at	the	trend	level	(for	both,	ρ	=	-.17,	
p	<	.10).	
TAS-20	and	Emotional	Complexity	To	assess	the	relationship	between	alexithymia	and	measures	of	emotional	complexity,	variables	for	granularity	and	dialecticism	were	formed.		Emotion	granularity	
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variables	were	formed	by	calculating	intraclass	correlations	with	absolute	agreement	between	intensity	ratings	of	each	word	in	the	secondary	emotion	portion	of	the	experiment,	and	calculating	an	average	correlation	(Barrett	et	al.,	2001).		Separate	measures	were	calculated	for	positive	granularity	(assessing	correlations	between	positive	words	only)	and	negative	granularity	(assessing	correlations	between	negative	words	only).			The	average	correlation	coefficient	was	then	subject	to	Fisher’s	z	transformation,	which	for	for	ease	of	interpretation,	was	subtracted	from	one,	such	that	a	greater	score	indicates	higher	granularity	(this	reflects	standard	calculation	of	granularity	indices;	Barrett	et	al.,	2001;	Boden	et	al.,	2013;	Tugade	et	al.,	2004).			 Negative	granularity	was	associated	with	greater	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	(ρ	=	-0.24,	p	<	.05),	reduced	target	composite	(ρ	=	-0.21,	p	<	.05),	fewer	secondary	words	endorsed	overall	(ρ	=	-0.34,	p	<	.05),	reduced	intensity	of	secondary	emotion	words	(ρ	=	-0.34,	p	<	.05)	and	slower	response	time	for	arousal	(ρ	=	-0.21,	p	<	.05).	Negative	granularity	was	associated	with	positive	granularity	at	the	trend	level	(ρ	=	0.17,	p	<	.10);	no	other	variables	were	related	to	positive	granularity.		For	a	complete	correlation	table	of	task	variables	in	experiment	1,	see	Appendix	D.	Dialecticism	variables	were	formed	by	calculating	a	ratio	of	incongruent	emotion	endorsements	to	congruent	emotion	endorsements	for	positive	inductions	and	negative	inductions.		Positive	dialecticism	was	calculated	as	the	ratio	of	positive	endorsements	in	a	negative	emotion	induction	category	to	negative	endorsements	in	a	negative	induction	category.		Negative	dialecticism	was	calculated	as	the	ratio	of	negative	endorsements	in	a	positive	emotion	induction	category	to	positive	endorsements	in	a	positive	induction	
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category.		Because	resulting	variables	were	significantly	positively	skewed,	log10	transformations	were	applied	to	normalize	their	distribution.		 Positive	and	negative	dialecticism	were	associated	with	greater	number	of	secondary	words	endorsed	(ρ	=	0.26,	p	<	.01	and	ρ	=	0.54,	p	<	.001,	respectively),	greater	intensity	of	secondary	words	endorsed	(ρ	=	0.25,	p	<	.01	and	ρ	=	0.47,	p	<	.001,	respectively)	and	slower	RT	to	questions	about	secondary	intensity	(ρ	=	0.36,	p	<	.01	and	ρ	=	0.31,	p	<	.001,	respectively).		RT	findings	are	consistent	with	previous	literature	that	response	time	is	slower	following	ambiguous	stimuli	(Hock	&	Krohne,	2004;	Hock,	Krohne,	&	Kaiser,	1996;	Lischetze	et	al.,	2005).		In	addition,	negative	dialecticism	was	also	associated	with	greater	arousal	(ρ	=	0.24,	p	<	.05)	and	primary	intensity	at	the	trend	level	(ρ	=	0.20,	p	<	.10).		Positive	dialecticism	was	associated	with	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	(ρ	=	-0.19,	p	<	.10).				 TAS-20	total	score	was	associated	with	reduced	negative	granularity	(ρ	=	-0.20,	p	<	.05),	but	not	positive	granularity.		It	was	negatively	correlated	with	negative	dialecticism	at	the	trend	level	(ρ	=	-0.19,	p	<	.10)	but	not	positive	dialecticism.		Correlations	with	specific	TAS-20	subscales	are	reported	in	Table	6.			Males	demonstrated	significantly	lower	positive	granularity	(t(106)	=	-2.34,	p	<	.05)	and	positive	dialecticism	(t(106)	=	-2.18,	p	<	.05)	compared	to	females,	but	showed	no	difference	between	negative	granularity	and	dialecticism.	 	
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		 TAS-20	Subscales		 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	Negative	Granularity	 -0.14	 -0.17†	 -0.12	Positive	Granularity	 -0.01	 -0.13	 0.05	Negative	Dialecticism	 -0.08	 -0.11	 -0.26*	Positive	Dialecticism	 -0.11	 -0.07	 -0.04	
Table	6.		Measures	of	emotional	complexity	correlated	with	TAS-20	subscales.		Note.	†p	<	.10;	*p	<	.05		
Predictive	Value	of	Overall	Performance	Variables.		To	determine	the	value	of	performance	variables	and	aspects	of	emotional	complexity	for	predicting	alexithymia	subscales,	multiple	regression	models	were	performed.		Variables	were	entered	into	the	model	as	predictors	if	they	were	correlated	with	respective	subscales,	as	are	presented	in	Table	4	and	Table	6.			Results	of	regression	models	are	shown	in	table	7.		All	predictors	and	outcomes	met	assumptions	of	multivariate	analysis	(Tabachnick	&	Fidell,	2007).		All	models	remained	significant	when	controlling	for	gender	and	previous	exposure	to	videos.		 	
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	 t	 β	 df	 F	 R2	DIF	 		 		 (5,	101)	 2.27†	 0.06	Negative	Granularity		 -1.77†	 -0.18	 	 	 	Secondary	Intensity	RT	 -1.71†	 -0.22	 	 	 	Target	Emotion	RT	 -0.28	 -0.04	 	 	 	Primary	Intensity	RT	 -0.60	 -0.08	 	 	 	Target	Composite	 -0.40	 -0.04	 	 	 	DDF	 	 	 (2,	104)	 4.17*	 0.07	Subjective	Arousal	 2.51*	 0.24	 	 	 	Target	Composite	 0.71	 0.07	 	 	 	EOT	 	 	 (6,	100)	 3.90**	 0.14	Negative	Dialecticism	 -2.32*	 -0.24	 	 	 	Target	Composite	 2.56*	 0.26	 	 	 	Primary	Intensity	RT	 -1.23	 -0.16	 	 	 	Secondary	Intensity	RT	 -0.04	 -0.01	 	 	 	Number	Endorsed	 -0.04	 -0.02	 	 	 	Subjective	Arousal	 0.60	 0.06	 		 		 		
	Table	7.	Predicting	TAS-20	subscales	from	performance	variables	using	multiple	regression.		Note.		β	represents	standardized	beta	coefficient;	R2	represents	adjusted	R	squared;	these	models	remained	significant	when	controlling	for	gender	and	previous	experience.		*p	<	.05;	**p	<	.01.;	†	p	<	.10			 To	develop	more	parsimonious	models	for	future	testing,	a	second	set	of	models	was	generated	using	only	variables	that	contributed	to	models	significantly	and	statistical	trends.		Results	are	depicted	in	Table	8.	
		 t	 β	 df	 F	 R2	DIF	 		 		 (2,	105)	 5.25	 0.07	Secondary	Intensity	RT	 -2.83**	 -0.26	 	 	 	Negative	Granularity		 -1.76†	 -0.16	 	 	 	DDF	 	 	 (1,	106)	 7.88**	 0.06	Subjective	Arousal	 2.81**	 0.26	 	 	 	EOT	 	 	 (2,	105)	 10.10***	 0.15	Target	Composite	 3.43***	 0.31	 	 	 	Negative	Dialecticism	 -2.63**	 -0.24	 	 	 	
Table	8.		Parsimonious	multiple	regression	models	using	performance	variables	and	emotional	complexity	to	predict	alexithymia.	Note.	β	represents	standardized	beta	coefficient;	R2	represents	adjusted	R	squared		 	
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Overall,	DIF	was	best	predicted	by	faster	secondary	intensity	RT	and	reduced	negative	granularity.		DDF	was	best	predicted	by	subjective	arousal.		EOT	was	best	predicted	by	reduced	negative	dialecticism	and	increased	frequency	of	selecting	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	as	primary	emotional	experiences.	
Exploratory	Analysis	of	Secondary	Emotions	Condition.			To	explore	response	patterns	of	secondary	emotions,	elastic	net	regression	was	utilized.		Table	9	reports	summary	of	regression	coefficients	that	remain	significant	after	penalty,	all	of	which	present	values	e-6.		Blank	values	represent	coefficients	shrunk	to	0	after	applied	penalty.		Only	secondary	emotion	words	with	predictive	value	are	presented	in	the	table,	organized	by	TAS-20	subscale,	intensity	and	RT	ratings,	and	values	following	positive	and	negative	emotion	inductions.		Secondary	emotion	words	that	did	not	predict	TAS-20	subscales	include:	anger,	calm,	confusion,	contempt,	contentment,	enthusiasm,	happiness,	inspiration,	jittery	and	pride.		 	
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		 DDF	 DIF	 EOT		 Intensity	 RT	 Intensity	 RT	 Intensity	 RT			 +	 -	 +	 -	 +	 -	 +	 -	 +	 -	 +	 -	Amusement	 		 		 		 -9.88	 		 		 		 		 		 -1.93	 		Disgust	 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -3.33	 		 		 		Distress	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -6.16	 		Embarrassment	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -4.05	 		 		 		Excitement	 		 		 		 -2.93	 		 		 		 -4.70	 		 		 		 -9.64	Fear	 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -1.66	 		 		 		Guilt	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -8.35	 		 		 		Hostility	 	 		 -2.09	 		 		 		 -6.34	 		 -1.52	 		 		 		Interest	 		 		 -1.27	 -1.98	 		 		 -2.04	 -3.17	 		 		 		 -2.55	Irritability	 	 		 -7.81	 -5.80	 		 		 -1.37	 -5.23	 		 		 		 		Nervousness	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -2.80	Pain	 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -2.20	 		 		 -2.03	Pity	 		 		 		 		 		 -2.19	 		 -2.37	 -1.06	 		 -7.76	 -3.34	Relief	 	 		 		 		 		 		 -1.14	 		 		 		 		 		Sadness	 		 		 		 		 		 		 -4.28	 		 -2.73	 		 		 		Shame	 	 		 -9.14	 		 		 		 -1.58	 -2.48	 		 		 -4.67	 		Surprise	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -3.18	 		 		 		 		Tension	 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -1.59	Upset	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 -3.52	 		 		 -1.51	
Table	9.	Identifying	secondary	words	with	predictive	value	based	on	elastic	net	procedure.	
Note.	“+”	indicates	variables	following	a	positive	emotion	induction;	“-”	indicates	variables	following	a	negative	emotion	induction.		
Post-Experiment	Questions	TAS-20	total	score	was	associated	with	perceiving	the	task	as	more	challenging	(ρ	=	0.21,	p	<	.05)	and	at	the	statistical	trend	level,	less	enjoyable	(ρ	=	0.18,	p	<	.10).		Challenge	was	driven	by	DIF	(ρ	=	0.24,	p	<	.05)	and	DDF	at	the	statistical	trend	level	(ρ	=	0.18,	p	<	.10).		Enjoy	was	driven	by	EOT	at	the	statistical	trend	level	(ρ	=	-0.16,	p	<	.10).			
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Discussion	The	current	study	investigated	the	role	of	alexithymia	in	emotion	processing	with	a	novel	laboratory-based	experiment.		Participants	viewed	video	clips	standardized	to	elicit	a	particular	emotional	state	then	responded	to	a	series	of	questions	about	their	subjective	experience.		From	these	responses,	various	performance	measures	were	generated,	including	subjective	experiences,	implicit	measures	of	emotion	processing	(i.e.,	response	time)	and	aspects	of	emotional	complexity.	In	addition	to	subjective	arousal,	well	studied	in	this	field,	labeling	primary	emotion,	response	time,	emotional	granularity	and	dialecticism	emerged	as	important	predictors	of	alexithymia.		Relationships	between	alexithymia	and	these	factors	have	been	minimally	studied	and	thus	hold	promise	for	further	elucidating	the	construct	through	future	research.		Results	speak	to	the	disparate	theoretical	underpinnings	of	TAS-20	subscales,	and	provide	a	basis	for	multiple	avenues	of	further	research.	
Overall	Performance		Alexithymia	was	associated	with	various	abnormalities	in	overall	performance.	Emotion-inducing	videos	utilized	in	this	study	are	well	validated	for	eliciting	a	particular	emotional	state,	or	“target”	emotion;	alexithymia	was	associated	with	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	this	target	emotion.		In	part,	this	was	due	to	greater	variability	in	primary	emotional	experience;	those	with	heightened	alexithymia	selected	more	non-target	emotions	as	primary.		Individuals	with	low	alexithymia	evidenced	greater	consistency	in	selecting	the	intended	primary	emotion,	consistent	with	accessing	normative	emotional	concepts	to	make	sense	of	their	internal	emotional	experiences.		Consistent	with	the	theory	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	impoverished	or	decreased	access	to	conceptual	
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information	about	emotions	(Kashdan	et	al.,	2015;	Nook	et	al.,	2015),	alexithymia	was	associated	with	selecting	a	wider	range	of	primary	emotions.		For	example,	whereas	a	video	of	a	woman	eating	her	dog’s	feces	unambiguously	and	quickly	elicited	the	concept	“disgust”	for	most	participants,	those	with	high	alexithymia	endorse	“embarrassment,”	“contempt,”	“confusion,”	“no	emotion”	and	even	“amusement”	as	primary	emotional	experience.	Reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	was	also	driven	by	greater	frequency	of	selecting	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	as	primary	among	individuals	with	elevated	alexithymia,	and	was	among	the	best	predictors	of	the	EOT	subscale.		It	is	impressive	that	this	pattern	emerged,	considering	contextual	cues	aid	emotion	identification	(Nook	et	al.,	2015;	Halberstadt	&	Niedenthal,	2001),	a	wealth	of	which	were	provided	in	the	current	study	(e.g.,	inclusion	of	simple	and	familiar	themes,	such	as	death;	provision	of	emotion	label	words)	that	could	have	facilitated	a	response	based	on	external	(rather	than	internal)	information.	This	suggests	alexithymia	involves	a	lack	of	awareness	of	internal	emotional	states,	even	in	response	to	relatively	intense	and	discrete	inductions	accompanied	by	numerous	contextual	cues.			Selecting	“no	emotion”	may	result	from	having	an	increased	threshold	through	which	emotionally	relevant	cues	enter	consciousness.		If	individuals	recognize	the	presence	of	an	emotional	state,	but	lack	refined	conceptual	knowledge	about	emotion,	they	may	be	likely	to	endorse	“confusion”	as	primary	emotional	experience.		It	could	also	be	the	case	that	alexithymia	is	truly	associated	with	experiencing	“no	emotion”	in	response	to	the	film	clips	in	this	study;	however,	a	wealth	of	evidence	suggests	alexithymia	is	associated	with	intact	physiological	correlates	of	emotion	(e.g.,	Bausch	et	al.,	2001;	Constantinou,	et	al.,	2014;	Eastabrook	et	al.,	2013;	Pollatos	et	al.,	2008;	Roedema	&	Simons,	1999)	and	
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inaccurate	reporting	about	internal	experiences	(e.g.,	Constantinou		et	al.,	2014;	Stone	and	Nielson,	2001;	Franz	et	al.,	2003;	Pollatos	et	al.,	2011;	Vanman	et	al.,	1998).			Alexithymia	was	associated	with	faster	response	times	to	questions	about	emotional	intensity.		This	finding	is	inconsistent	with	work	showing	faster	response	time	to	emotional	questions	is	associated	with	greater	emotional	clarity	(Lischetzke	et	al.,	2005;	Lischetzke	et	al.,	2011),	a	construct	thought	to	overlap	with	the	alexithymia	(Taylor,	2004).		However,	the	stimuli	used	in	the	present	study	where	relatively	complex	and	intense	compared	to	Lischetzke	et	al.	(2005)	and	Lischetzke	et	al.	(2011),	and	may	reflect	reduced	dialecticism	of	experiences	that	entailed	greater	mixed	affect.		Research	shows	that	when	answering	questions	following	the	presentation	of	ambiguous	stimuli,	response	time	slows		(Hock	&	Krohne,	2004;	Hock,	Krohne,	&	Kaiser,	1996;	Lischetzke	et	al.,	2005).		Thus,	if	alexithymia	entails	reduced	complexity	of	emotional	experience,	it	would	follow	that	response	time	would	be	faster	compared	to	a	normative	population	in	response	to	the	same	stimuli.		In	fact,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	reduced	negative	dialecticism	in	the	current	study.		Because	dialecticism	of	emotional	experiences	is	adaptive,	faster	response	time	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia	may	indicate	a	problematic	lack	of	dialectical	thinking,	or	lack	of	awareness	of	mixed	emotional	states.	Similarly,	faster	response	times	in	the	present	study	could	reflect	reduced	contemplation	about	emotional	states	prior	to	responding.	
Emotional	Complexity	Total	alexithymia	score	was	associated	with	reduced	negative	granularity,	reflecting	reduced	tendency	to	differentiate	between	negative	emotion	states.		This	finding	adds	credence	to	the	long-held	theory	that	those	with	elevated	alexithymia	experience	states	of	
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“undifferentiated	negative	affect”	(e.g.,	Lane,	1997).		Emotional	granularity	is	associated	with	increased	frequency	and	success	of	employing	emotion	regulation	strategies	in	response	to	negative	affect	(e.g.,	Barret	et	al.,	2001).		In	order	to	cope	effectively	in	situations	that	elicit	negative	affect,	one	must	be	capable	of	identifying	the	specific	emotion	state	that	needs	addressing	(Kashdan	et	al.,	2015).		For	example,	effective	strategies	for	reducing	“anger”	are	different	from	strategies	utilized	to	reduce	“sadness.”		Deficits	in	emotion	granularity	may	help	explain	why	alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	use	of	effective	coping	strategies	(e.g.,	Fukunishi	&	Rahe	1995;	Moriguchi	et	al.,	2007;	Parker	et	al.	1998;	Swart	et	al.,	2009;	Vingerhoets,	van	den	Berg,	Kortekaas,	van	Heck,	&	Croon,	1993).		In	the	absence	of	emotional	awareness,	those	with	elevated	alexithymia	may	not	have	the	necessary	information	to	differentiate	affective	states.		Because	poor	regulation	of	negative	affect	leads	to	poor	health	outcomes	(see	Desteno	et	al.,	2013	for	review),	reduced	negative	granularity	may	also	help	explain	why	alexithymia	is	associated	with	many	medical	comorbidities	(e.g.,	Tominaga,	Choi,	Nagoshi,	&	Fukui,	2013).			Alexithymia	was	also	associated	with	reduced	negative	dialecticism,	or	endorsing	the	experience	of	negative	affective	states	following	a	positive	emotion	induction.		This	finding	is	particularly	impressive	as	the	videos	selected	for	use	in	the	current	study	were	selected	to	elicit	intense	prototypical	emotional	states,	and	thus	not	designed	to	elicit	mexed	emotion.		A	core	component	of	dialectical	behavioral	therapy	(Linehan,	1993),	dialecticism	has	clear	implications	for	mental	health,	by	enhancing	emotion	regulation	and	distress	tolerance,	among	other	benefits	(e.g.,	Lynch,	Chapman,	Rosenthal,	Kuo,	&	Linehan,	2006).		It	is	adaptive	to	recognize	negative	affect	during	a	primarily	positive	emotional	
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state;	for	example,	if	you	come	home	in	good	spirits	after	a	great	day	at	work	and	find	your	partner	has	had	a	terrible	day,	it	benefits	both	parties	if	you	can	empathize	by	attuning	to	your	partner’s	negative	affective	experiences	in	conjunction	with	your	overall	positive	affective	state.		Accordingly,	dialecticism	may	promote	empathizing	with	others.	There	was	no	relationship	between	positive	dialecticism	and	alexithymia	in	the	current	study,	however	this	effect	may	be	understated	as	the	task	design	was	better	suited	to	tap	into	negative	dialecticism.		In	fact,	positive	dialecticism	was	associated	with	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion,	suggesting	that	as	assessed	in	the	current	study,	elevated	positive	dialecticism	did	not	promote	normative	emotional	processing.		The	positive	films	presented	in	this	paradigm	are	inherently	more	ambiguous	than	those	used	to	induce	negative	affect.	For	example,	one	of	two	amusement	inductions	depicts	Robin	William’s	performing	standup	comedy.		All	data	collection	was	conducted	shortly	after	William’s	unfortunate	death	in	August	2014,	so	it	is	not	surprising	that	28%	of	participants	endorsed	sadness	as	a	secondary	emotion.	The	same	clip	has	references	to	drug	use	and	drunk	driving,	which	may	explain	why	15%	of	participants	endorsed	“disgust”	as	a	secondary	emotion.		Similarly,	the	second	amusement-inducing	clip,	from	When	Harry	Met	Sally,	depicts	a	scene	in	which	the	actress	Meg	Ryan	demonstrates	her	ability	to	fake	an	orgasm	in	a	crowded	restaurant;	thus,	it	is	not	surprising	that	45%	of	participants	endorsed	“embarrassment”	as	a	secondary	emotion.		Consequently,	a	degree	of	dialecticism	may	be	normative	for	positive	emotion	inductions	in	this	study,	whereas	greater	endorsement	of	positive	emotions	in	negative	film	clips	(e.g.,	apartheid	scene	in	Cry	Freedom)	does	not	represent	adaptive	emotional	processing.		Future	studies	should	continue	investigating	the	
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role	of	positive	dialecticism	in	alexithymia,	as	well	as	its	negative	consequences,	using	ambiguous	stimuli.		The	current	paradigm	could	easily	be	adapted	to	investigate	this	possibility	in	the	future,	by	replacing	Gross	and	Levenson’s	(1995)	film	clips	with	more	ambiguous	inductions.	The	current	study	suggests	alexithymia	is	associated	with	intact	ability	to	differentiate	between	positive	affective	states.		There	were	also	no	differences	between	positive	emotional	differentiation	in	alexithymia.		It	may	be	that	greater	deficits	are	observed	in	complexity	of	the	experience	of	negative	emotions	because	of	the	tendency	for	those	with	elevated	alexithymia	to	avoid	or	suppress	negative	affect	(Páez	et	al.,	1999;	Panayiotou	et	al.,	2014;	Parker	et	al.,	1998;	Swart	et	al.,	2009)	which	may	interfere	with	the	development	of	effective	conceptual	knowledge	of	these	experiences.		Interestingly,	positive	granularity	was	not	correlated	with	any	performance	variables	in	the	current	study,	suggest	that	in	general,	it	may	entail	underpinnings	distinct	from	negative	granularity.		In	either	case,	findings	are	promising	as	they	reveal	intact	granularity	in	alexithymia;	it	may	be	that	negative	granularity	and	dialecticism	can	be	enhanced	through	intervention,	which	may	reduce	its	problematic	behavioral	correlates.	
Subscale	Analysis	Performance	variables	differentially	predicted	TAS-20	subscales;	each	subscale	was	predicted	by	a	distinct	pattern	of	performance	variables.		These	disparate	findings	underscore	important	theoretical	differences	between	components	of	alexithymia	and	speak	to	the	importance	of	considering	subscales	independently,	rather	than	assessing	TAS-20	only	in	its	composite	score.	Subjective	arousal	best	predicted	DDF;	those	with	elevated	DDF	scores	reported	reduced	arousal	overall.		DIF	was	best	predicted	by	faster	
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secondary	intensity	RT	and	at	the	trend	level,	reduced	negative	granularity.		EOT	was	best	predicted	by	reduced	negative	dialecticism	and	increased	target	composite	(selecting	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	as	primary	emotions).		Predictive	models	explained	the	most	variance	in	EOT	scores	(15%).		A	preference	for	externally	oriented	thinking	may	relate	to	a	higher	than	average	threshold	for	recognizing	the	correlates	of	an	emotional	experience,	resulting	in	generation	of	“no	emotion”	or	“confusion”	as	primary	emotional	state.		Similarly,	it	may	limit	recognition	of	negative	emotions	experienced	during	primarily	positive	affective	states	(e.g.,	“sadness”	when	watching	Robin	William’s	standup	comedy).		Reduced	subjective	arousal	in	DDF	may	result	in	reduced	awareness	of	interoceptive	correlates	of	emotional	experiences.		DIF	was	best	predicted	by	reduced	negative	granularity	and	faster	response	time	for	reporting	secondary	intensity.			The	ability	to	“identify	feelings”	may	involve	clearly	and	discretely	identifying	emotional	states;	faster	response	time	may	indicate	reduced	complexity	of	emotional	experiences	while	reduced	negative	granularity	indicates	diffuse	versus	specific	experience	of	negative	affect.		Future	studies	should	carefully	parse	behavioral	findings	as	they	relate	to	specific	TAS-20	subscales.		Doing	so	may	illuminate	inconsistencies	in	the	field	and	promote	generation	of	clearer	themes	in	alexithymia.	
Secondary	Emotion	Words	Exploratory	analysis	of	specific	secondary	emotion	words	was	employed	to	identify	superfluous	emotion	word	variables	to	potentially	be	deleted	in	future	iterations,	increasing	task	efficiency.		This	analysis	conveys	that	the	following	emotions	do	not	have	value	for	predicting	TAS-20	subscales:	anger,	calm,	confusion,	contempt,	contentment,	enthusiasm,	happiness,	inspiration,	jittery,	pride.		Future	iterations	of	this	task	may	
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consider	removing	these	words	to	increase	efficiency.	The	word	“pity”	carried	significant	variance	in	its	intensity	ratings	and	RT	ratings	in	both	DIF	and	EOT	subscales.		Inclusion	of	this	word	was	the	result	of	piloting	this	study.		It	is	not	a	part	of	PANAS	(Watson	et	al.,	1988)	nor	the	original	Gross	and	Levenson	(1995)	battery;	thus,	it	may	be	considered	in	the	future	as	a	relevant	in	alexithymia	studies.			Patterns	revealed	in	this	analysis	validate	several	additional	task	findings.		In	predicting	EOT,	intensity	of	only	words	following	positive	emotion	inductions	carry	predictive	weight.		Of	these	words,	all	are	negative,	validating	the	finding	that	the	EOT	subscale	is	associated	with	reduced	negative	dialecticism.		No	intensity	ratings	of	secondary	emotions	predict	the	DDF	subscale,	and	only	two	(amusement	following	positive	induction,	pity	following	negative	induction)	predict	DIF.		Secondary	intensity	response	times	following	positive	and	negative	inductions	predict	DIF,	consistent	with	the	previous	finding	that	overall	response	time	in	secondary	emotion	condition	best	predicts	the	DIF	subscale.		Response	times	to	specific	items	contribute	significant	variance	across	other	subscales	and	emotion	inductions,	highlighting	its	potential	future	use	as	an	implicit	measure	of	emotion	processing	in	alexithymia.		
Post-Experiment	Measures		Finally,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	experiencing	the	task	as	more	challenging	(driven	by	DIF	and	DDF)	and	less	enjoyable	(driven	by	EOT).	These	ratings	speak	to	the	subjective	challenge	of	reflecting	on	emotional	states	in	those	who	struggle	to	identify	and	describe	their	internal	experiences,	and	the	preference	of	those	with	externally-oriented	cognitive	styles	to	avoid	thinking	about	emotional	experiences.	
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Limitations	Providing	emotion	labels	was	an	important	first	step	for	this	line	of	work;	however,	doing	so	inevitably	confers	study	limitations.	Evidence	suggests	reports	of	emotional	experience	are	more	likely	to	be	biased	by	external	information	rather	than	interoceptive	cues	in	individuals	with	alexithymia	(Peasley-Miklus,	2015),	which	might	explain	the	discrepancy	between	physiology	and	subjective	report	in	alexithymia	(e.g.,	Stone	and	Nielson,	2001;	Franz,	et	al.,	2003;	Pollatos	et	al.,	2001;	Vanman	et	al.,	1998).		Emotion	labels	provide	contextual	cues	that	may	serve	to	normalize	subjective	report,	increasing	the	chance	of	responding	based	on	knowledge	of	an	emotion	category	rather	that	one’s	experience	of	an	emotion.			It	might	also	be	the	case	that	providing	labels	has	a	restorative	effect	on	deficits	in	emotion	processing,	as	evidenced	in	facial	emotion	recognition	work	(Nook	et	al.,	2015).	Providing	labels	in	the	current	study	might	have	facilitated	access	to	internal	emotional	states,	which	might	explain	why	there	weren’t	greater	deficits	in	selecting	the	target	emotion	as	primary.		This	possibility	presents	interesting	avenues	of	future	research	that	have	the	potential	to	enhance	intervention	in	those	with	elevated	alexithymia.		Future	studies	could	easily	adapt	the	current	paradigm	to	address	this	question,	by	replacing	emotion	labels	with	prompts	for	free	response.	In	either	case,	results	of	the	present	study	would	likely	differ	if	participants	were	prompted	to	identify	emotional	states	using	free	response.		Similarly,	results	should	be	considered	in	light	of	the	nature	of	laboratory-based	designs,	which	are	more	likely	to	tap	into	capacity	for	emotion	processing	versus	the	tendency	to	do	so,	a	distinction	that	Torrisi	and	colleagues	(Torrisi,	Lieberman,	Bookheimer,	&	Altshuler,	2013)	highlight	in	their	work	
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on	affect	labeling.		In	the	absence	of	ecological	validity	assessment,	it	is	impossible	to	know	the	extent	to	which	the	process	of	emotion	labeling	is	employed	in	every	day	emotional	processing.		Similarly,	emotional	granularity	is	traditionally	measured	using	experience	sampling	methods	(e.g.,	Tugade	et	al.,	2004);	such	methodology	is	essential	for	understanding	how	deficits	in	granularity	manifest	in	daily	life.		Experience	sampling	methods	are	an	important	next	step	in	parsing	this	difference	in	alexithymia.		 This	study	would	have	benefited	from	consideration	of	depressive	symptoms,	known	to	affect	levels	of	alexithymia;	though	participants	were	screened	for	psychopathology,	it	is	likely	that	sub-clinical	depressive	symptoms	were	present	in	this	population.		The	current	study	also	did	not	collect	a	baseline	measure	of	response	time,	important	for	interpreting	response	latency	results	(Fazio,	1990).	The	current	study	sought	to	understand	alexithymia	as	it	is	normally	distributed	in	the	population,	instead	of	comparing	groups	with	high	and	low	alexithymia.	Understanding	how	alexithymia	affects	emotional	processing	in	a	normal	population	is	important;	however,	the	latter	approach	would	likely	reveal	more	significant	performance	deficits.	Thus,	these	findings	should	be	replicated	in	groups	with	significantly	high	levels	of	alexithymia,	as	well	as	psychopathology	populations	marked	by	heightened	alexithymia	(e.g.,	autism	spectrum	disorders,	schizophrenia).		
Conclusions	The	current	study	presents	a	novel	laboratory-based	paradigm	that	can	be	utilized	in	the	future	to	investigate	follow-up	research	questions	generated	in	this	study.		Results	highlight	abnormalities	in	a	number	of	emotional	processing	domains,	including	several	that	have	been	minimally	studied	in	this	field.	Consistent	with	theory	that	alexithymia	is	
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associated	with	impoverished	emotion	concepts	(Kashdan	et	al.,2015;	Lindquist	&	Barrett,	2008),	alexithymia	was	associated	with	reduced	tendency	to	select	intended	emotional	experiences	as	primary.		This	is	particularly	interesting	considering	inductions	in	the	current	study	were	relatively	intense,	discrete,	and	accompanied	by	a	number	of	contextual	cues.		In	daily	life,	relevant	emotional	experiences	are	rarely	this	prototypical;	thus,	it	follows	that	conceptualization	of	emotional	states	are	more	problematic	in	daily	emotional	processing,	and	their	individual	and	interpersonal	consequences	magnified.	Consistent	with	accounts	that	alexithymia	is	associated	with	states	of	undifferentiated	negative	affect	(Lane	et	al.,	1997),	the	construct	was	associated	with	reduced	negative	granularity	and	reduced	negative	dialecticism	in	the	current	study.		Faster	RTs	in	response	to	questions	about	emotional	intensity	might	also	reflect	reduced	dialecticism.		Interestingly,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	neither	positive	granularity	nor	positive	dialecticism.	These	hopeful	results	suggest	the	possibility	of	intact	capacity	for	emotional	complexity	in	this	population	that	may	be	trained	to	improve	health	outcomes.		 Currently,	minimal	research	has	investigated	the	role	of	granularity,	dialecticism,	and	other	measures	of	emotional	complexity	in	alexithymia.	Reich	et	al.	(2013)	argue	that	emotional	complexity	comprises	multiple	aspects	of	emotional	experience,	which	should	be	studied	in	tandem	(Boden	et	al.,	2013).		Results	of	the	current	study	highlight	the	necessity	of	continued	investigation	of	these	constructs	in	the	field,	demonstrating	that	their	predictive	value	surpasses	other	commonly	utilized	measures,	such	as	emotional	intensity.			 Future	research	is	needed	to	continue	identifying	problematic	elements	of	emotional	processing	in	alexithymia,	as	well	as	their	behavioral	consequences.		The	current	study	points	to	ways	in	which	alexithymia	might	lead	to	problematic	mental	and	physical	
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health	outcomes:	reduced	emotional	awareness	may	hinder	development	or	utilization	of	conceptual	emotional	knowledge,	which	may	prohibit	effective	emotion	differentiation,	limiting	tailored	options	for	emotion	regulation.		The	task	presented	in	this	study	can	be	utilized	as	is	or	adapted	to	continue	investigating	these	possibilities	further	in	laboratory-based	settings.		 	
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CHAPTER	III	
Experiment	2:	Investigating	the	Relationship	Between	Alexithymia	and	Interoceptive	
Accuracy	and	Examining	the	Benefits	of	a	Brief	Mindfulness	Meditation		
Aims	1) Assess	the	relationship	between	alexithymia	and	measures	of	interoceptive	awareness.	2) Test	the	benefit	of	a	brief	mindfulness	meditation	for	improving	interoceptive	awareness	and	deficits	in	emotional	processing	identified	in	experiment	one.	3) Examine	the	relationship	between	interoceptive	awareness,	alexithymia,	and	meditation	on	measures	of	emotional	processing.	
Methods	
Participants		78	undergraduates	were	recruited	and	received	course	credit	for	their	participation.	As	in	the	previous	study,	exclusion	criteria	were	a	past	or	current	diagnosis	of	depression,	anxiety,	or	substance	use	disorder.		Because	of	equipment	failure,	two	participants	were	excluded.		Of	the	76	remaining	participants,	66%	were	women.	The	average	age	was	19.70	(SD	=	0.95).		Participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	a	meditation	or	a	control	group	(see	below	for	details).	There	were	no	group	differences	in	gender	(χ2(1)	=.06,	p	=	.81)	or	age	(t(72)	=	.229,	p	=	.82).		54%	of	participants	identified	as	Caucasian,	16%	African	American	or	African;	15%	Asian	or	Asian	American	3%	Hispanic,	and	10%	“Multiracial”	or	“other.”		There	were	no	group	differences	between	racial	background	(χ2(6)	=	10.42,	p	=	.11).	
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Materials		 Apparatus.		In	addition	to	equipment	used	in	experiment	one,	a	Polar	H7	Bluetooth	Smart	Heart	Rate	Sensor	was	utilized	to	measure	heart	rate.		The	sensor	is	attached	to	a	strap	that	wraps	around	the	chest,	below	the	pectoral	line.		To	facilitate	connection,	the	back	of	the	strap	was	wet	with	a	moist	cotton	ball	prior	to	donning.			Heart	rate	data	was	transmitted	using	Bluetooth	technology	to	a	4th	generation	iPad	using	the	Polar	Beat	App	for	iPad.		 Questionnaires.	As	in	experiment	1,	Participants	completed	the	Toronto	Alexithymia	Scale	(TAS-20;	Bagby,	et	al.,	1994).		Chronbach’s	alpha	was	0.64	in	this	sample.	Throughout	the	experiment,	the	reported	arousal	and	intensity	ratings	using	a	1-9	Likert	scale.			Participants	also	completed	a	brief	demographics	questionnaire,	which	in	addition	to	age,	gender	and	race,	asked	for	height	and	weight	to	calculate	body	mass	index	(BMI).	
	 Audio	stimuli.		Participants	listened	to	a	ten-minute	audio	recording	prior	to	beginning	the	experimental	portion	of	the	study.	Participants	assigned	to	the	meditation	group	listened	to	a	recording	guiding	them	through	a	body	scan	mediation,	in	which	participants	were	instructed	to	mindfully	attend	to	their	breath	and	specific	parts	of	their	body.		Participants	in	the	control	group	listened	to	a	passage	from	a	natural	history	text	book.			Recordings	were	generated	and	validated	by	Cropley,	Ussher	&	Charitou	(2007).				
Design	and	Procedure	After	written	informed	consent	was	obtained,	participants	completed	a	demographic	form	and	questionnaire	battery.			Using	a	random	number	generator,	they	were	randomly	assigned	to	group	(meditation	or	control)	and	run	order.		As	in	the	previous	
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study,	there	were	two	counterbalanced	run	orders	in	which	positive	and	negative	emotion	eliciting	videos	were	evenly	distributed.			
Procedure.		Participants	were	provided	verbal	and	visual	instructions	for	applying	the	heart	rate	monitor,	after	which	they	had	the	opportunity	to	ask	questions	and	decline	to	participate	in	this	portion	of	the	experiment.		If	willing,	the	experimenter	left	the	room	while	the	participant	applied	the	monitor.		Heart	rate	was	monitored	before	and	after	the	experimental	portion,	so	for	efficiency,	participants	wore	it	throughout	testing.	
Heartbeat	tracking	task.	Schandry’s	(1981)	heartbeat	tracking	paradigm	was	employed	after	completing	questionnaires.		A	baseline	measure	was	collected	after	completing	questionnaires	and	a	follow-up	measure	collected	after	emotion	induction	task.	Participants	were	instructed	to	sit	with	eyes	closed	and	hands	on	the	table	with	palms	face	up	to	prevent	utilizing	pulse	detection	as	a	proxy	for	heartbeat.			They	were	instructed:	“Count	the	number	of	times	you	think	your	heart	beats.”		They	first	completed	a	30s	practice	trial	and	had	the	opportunity	to	ask	questions.		Next,	they	completed	25s,	35s	and	45s	trials.		After	each	trial,	they	were	asked	“how	many	times	did	your	heart	beat.”		After	completing	all	four	trials,	they	were	asked	to	rate	confidence	in	their	estimation	as	well	as	perceived	difficulty	on	1-10	scales	(1	=	“not	at	all	confident”/“extremely	easy”;	10	=	“completely	confident”/“extremely	difficult”).		
	 Interoceptive	accuracy	was	calculated	as	average	percent	accuracy	of	all	three	heart	beat	counting	trials.	Because	interoceptive	sensitivity	is	inversely	related	to	body	fat	(Rouse,	Jones	&	Jones,	1988)	and	in	line	with	formal	recommendations	for	analyzing	interoceptive	accuracy	data	detailed	in	Kleckner	et	al.	(Kleckner,	Wormwood,	Simmons,	Barrett,	&	Quigley,	2015),	BMI	was	entered	as	a	covariate	in	all	interoception	analyses.			
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Emotion	induction	task.			After	completing	the	first	heartbeat	detection	task,	participants	completed	a	practice	trial	of	the	emotion	induction	task	as	in	experiment	one.		Afterwards,	they	completed	the	task	exactly	as	it	described	in	experiment	one.	
Data	Analytic	Approach	
Missing	and	outlying	data.	Similar	to	experiment	one,	technical	errors	resulted	in	some	missing	data.		In	this	case,	0.001%	of	performance	data	was	missing.		One	participant	was	missing	data	from	one	disgust	trial.		As	before,	data	from	the	existing	disgust	trial	were	imputed	to	calculate	overall	aggregate	variables.		Data	in	the	present	study	was	also	affected	by	RT	outliers.		As	before,	outliers	were	defined	as	data	points	6	SDs	greater	than	the	mean,	and	were	winsorized.			A	total	of	0.004%	of	response	time	variables	were	adjusted	in	the	control	condition	and	0.003%	in	the	meditation	condition.		All	variables	met	assumptions	of	linear	regression	(Tabachnick	&	Fidell,	2007).		 Three	participants	were	missing	heart	rate	data:	one	participant	declined	to	participate	in	this	portion,	and	two	participants	were	missing	data	due	to	equipment	problems.		Two	additional	participants	missed	follow-up	heartbeat	detection	measures	due	to	time	constraints.	
Results	
Descriptive	Statistics	
Alexithymia.		Means,	standard	deviations,	and	t	values	for	group	differences	in	TAS-20	are	depicted	in	Table	10.			A	one-way	ANOVA	was	employed	to	compare	TAS-20	scores	from	experiment	one,	the	control	condition	and	meditation	condition	in	experiment	two.		There	were	no	significant	differences	between	total	score	(F(2,	181)	=	.40,	p	=	0.67)	or	any	
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subscales	(ps	>	0.27).		There	was	no	significant	difference	between	TAS-20	total	scores	in	males	compared	to	females.			 Control	 Meditation	 t	DDF	 11.76(3.73)	 12.00(3.58)	 -0.28	DIF	 14.76(3.69)	 15.08(4.93)	 -0.32	EOT	 18.08(4.69)	 17.45(3.55)	 0.66	Total	 44.61(9.53)	 44.53(9.31)	 0.04	
Table	10.		Descriptive	information	and	tests	of	group	differences	for	TAS-20	scores	in	meditation	and	control	groups.	
	
Measures	of	interoception.		Means	and	standard	deviations	for	interoception	variables	are	presented	in	Table	11,	as	well	as	their	change	scores	from	baseline	to	follow-up.		There	were	no	baseline	differences	between	control	and	meditation	group.		There	were	also	no	gender	or	BMI	differences.		From	baseline	to	follow-up,	the	only	group	difference	was	a	reduction	in	confidence	in	the	meditation	group	(t(38)	=	2.10,	p	<	.05).		Follow-up	analyses	revealed	this	was	only	true	for	those	who	had	low	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	(t(25)	=	2.40,	p	<	.05).		Interoceptive	accuracy	was	correlated	with	perceived	difficulty	(r	=	-0.36,	p	<	.01).		Difficulty	and	confidence	ratings	were	also	correlated	(r	=	-0.35,	p	<	.01).			Interoceptive	accuracy	and	confidence	were	not	correlated.			 Control	 		 Meditation	BMI	 22.87	(2.75)	 	 22.26	(3.47)			 Pre	 Post	 Δ	 		 Pre	 Post	 Δ	Heart	rate	 76.07(12.54)	 69.19(8.97)	 6.64	 	 76.94(10.85)	 71.71(10.68)	 6.48	%	Accuracy	 0.69	(0.17)	 0.75(0.15)	 0.06	 		 0.72	(0.18)	 0.80	(0.15)	 0.08	Confidence	 5.56	(1.90)	 5.97	(1.67)	 0.41	 		 6.18	(2.04)	 5.89	(1.99)	 -0.29	Difficulty	 6.08	(1.86)	 5.62	(1.90)	 -0.46	 		 5.44(2.00)	 5.16	(1.92)	 -0.28		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table	11.	Means	and	standard	deviations	for	interoceptive	variables	in	control	and	meditation	conditions.	Note:	Δ	refers	to	change	in	score	from	baseline	to	post	measures;		t	scores	represent	group	differences	in	change	between	control	and	meditation	group;	BMI	refers	to	body	mass	index.	
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Relationship	Between	Alexithymia	and	Interoception	at	Baseline	
	Interoceptive	accuracy.	Based	on	visual	inspection	of	scatterplots	depicting	the	relationship	between	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	and	TAS-20	total	score,	the	quadratic	relationships	between	TAS-20	total	and	each	subscale	was	tested	using	hierarchical	linear	regression.	An	example	of	the	quadratic	relationship	observed	is	depicted	in	Figure	6.		
	
Figure	6.	Quadratic	relationship	between	TAS-20	and	interoceptive	awareness.			BMI	was	entered	as	the	first	step	of	the	model.		BMI	alone	significantly	predicted	DIF	score	(F	(1,68)	=	4.78,	R2	=	.07,	p	<	.05).		Alone,	it	predicted	no	other	subscale.		The	linear	term	was	entered	as	the	second	step	of	the	model,	and	the	quadratic	term	entered	as	the	third.		For	all	models,	the	quadratic	term	best	captured	the	relationship,	as	it	significantly	increased	R2	from	its	linear	term.		Interoceptive	accuracy	predicted	TAS-20	total	score	(F	(1,66)	=	10.98,	R2	=	.16,	p	<	.01),	and	in	order	of	significance,	EOT	(F	(1,68)	=	7.82,	R2	=	.12,	
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p	<	.01),	DDF	(F	(1,68)	=	7.18,	R2	=	.13,	p	<	.01)	and	DIF	(F	(1,68)	=	4.27,	R2	=	.13,	p	<	.05).		Summary	depicted	in	Table	12.			 Step	1	 	 Step2	 	 Step3		 B	(SD)	 β	 	 B	(SD)	 β	 	 B	(SD)	 β	TAS-20	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		BMI	 -0.38	(.35)	 -0.13	 	 -0.35	(0.36)	 -0.12	 	 -0.29	(0.34)	 -0.10	HBD	 	 	 	 -3.85	(6.50)	 -0.07	 	 -132.18	(39.20)	 -2.48**	HBD2	 	 	 		 	 	 		 96.56	(29.13)	 2.44**	R2	 		 0.02	 	 		 0.02	 	 		 0.16	F	for	ΔR2	 		 1.16	 		 		 0.35	 		 		 10.98**	Model	F	 	 1.16	 	 	 0.75	 	 	 4.24**	
DDF	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	BMI	 -0.18	(.14)	 -0.15	 	 -0.16	(0.14)	 -0.14	 	 -0.14	(.13)	 -1.04	HBD	 	 	 	 -2.23	(2.51)	 -0.11	 	 -43.26	(15.50)	 -2.79**	HBD2	 	 	 		 	 	 		 96.562	(29.14)	 2.68**	R2	 		 0.02	 	 		 0.04	 	 		 0.13	F	for	ΔR2	 	 1.16	 	 	 0.79	 	 	 7.18**	Model	F	 	 1.16	 	 	 1.21	 	 	 3.27**	
DIF	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		BMI	 -0.36	(.16)	 -0.26	 	 -0.34	(0.16)	 -0.24	 	 -0.32	(.16)	 -0.23	HBD	 	 	 	 -2.42	(3.01)	 -0.10	 	 -41.15	(18.97)	 -1.63*	HBD2	 	 	 		 	 	 		 96.562	(29.14)	 2.68*	R2	 		 0.07	 	 		 0.08	 	 		 0.13	F	for	ΔR2	 	 4.78*	 		 		 0.65	 		 		 4.27*	Model	F	 	 4.78*	 	 	 2.70†	 	 	 	
EOT	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	BMI	 -0.15	(.16)	 -0.12	 	 -0.15	(0.16)	 -0.11	 	 -0.17	(.15)	 -0.13	HBD	 	 	 	 -0.80	(2.86)	 -0.03	 	 -47.77	(17.58)	 -2.72**	HBD2	 	 	 		 	 	 		 36.55	(13.07)	 2.80**	R2	 		 0.01	 	 		 0.02	 	 		 0.12	F	for	ΔR2	 		 0.96	 		 		 0.08	 		 		 7.82**	Model	F	 	 0.96	 	 	 0.51	 	 	 2.98*	
Table	12.	Hierarchical	multiple	regression	testing	the	quadratic	relationship	between	TAS-20	and	interocpetive	accuracy.		Note:	BMI	refers	to	body	mass	index.		HBD	indicates	interocpetive	accuracy.		Alone,	HBD	refers	to	the	linear	term.		HBD2	refers	to	the	quadratic	term.	*p	<	.05;	**p	<	.01.		
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	 Interoceptive	awareness.	The	relationship	between	measures	of	confidence	in	heart	beat	estimation	and	perceived	task	difficulty	were	also	assessed	for	linear	and	quadratic	relationships.			Baseline	measures	of	confidence	quadratically	predicted	TAS-20	total	(F	(1,68)	=	2.83,	R2	=	.12,	p	<	.05),	with	a	significant	increase	from	the	linear	term	(F(1,62)	=		4.10,	ΔR2	=	.06,	p	<	.05).		Post-hoc	analyses	revealed	this	was	only	true	for	the	DIF	scale.	In	the	first	step	of	this	model,	BMI	significantly	predicted	DIF	(ΔF	(1,64)	=	4.73,	R2	=	.07,	p	<	.05).		Adding	the	linear	term	was	also	significant	(F	(1,63)	=	3.70,	R2	=	.11,	p	<	.05)	and	added	significantly	the	step	one	(ΔF(1,63)	=		2.56,	ΔR2	=	.06,	p	<	.05).	Adding	the	quadratic	term	was	significant	(F	(1,62)	=	4.57,	R2	=	.18,	p	<	.05),	adding	significantly	to	step	two	(ΔF(1,62)	=		5.76,	ΔR2	=	.08,	p	<	.05).		When	confidence	and	accuracy	quadratic	terms	were	entered	into	a	multiple	regression	equation,	the	predictive	value	of	confidence	terms	became	nonsignificant	(ps	>	.82),	suggesting	that	interoceptive	accuracy	better	captures	variance	in	the	DIF	subscale.	
Relationship	Between	Alexithymia	and	Interoception	at	Follow-Up	
		 Interoceptive	accuracy.	At	follow-up,	neither	linear	nor	quadratic	interoceptive	accuracy	terms	predicted	TAS-20	or	any	of	its	subscales,	with	or	without	group	assignment	entered	as	a	covariate.	Post	hoc	analyses	were	performed	to	better	understand	why	the	significant	relationship	between	TAS-20	and	post-interoceptive	accuracy	became	non-significant.	To	account	for	the	finding	that	alexithymia	was	associated	with	either	increased	or	decreased	heartbeat	detection	accuracy,	four	groups	were	created	by	splitting	alexithymia	and	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	scores	at	their	means	to	form	alexithymia/interoception	(A/I)	group	assignments:	1)	low	alexithymia	and	low	baseline	
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interoceptive	accuracy	(LA/LI);	2)	low	alexithymia	and	high	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	(LA/HI);	3)	high	alexithymia	and	low	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	(HA/LI);	and,	4)	high	alexithymia	and	high	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	(HA/HI).		There	were	no	significant	group	differences	in	matched	variables	(e.g.,	TAS-20	in	LA/LI	and	LA/HI).	Two	ANOVA	analyses	were	conducted	to	determine	whether	A/I	group	assignment	had	an	effect	on	interoceptive	accuracy	change	from	baseline	to	follow-up.	A/I	group	assignment	had	a	significant	effect	on	interoceptive	accuracy	change	in	the	control	group	(F(33,	3)	=	3.38,	p	<	.05)	and	meditation	group	(F(36,	3)	=	4.49,	p	<	.01).	Four	paired	sample	
t-tests	revealed	no	significant	differences	between	change	scores	in	each	four	A/I	group	assignments	in	meditation	versus	control	conditions,	so	subsequent	analysis	reflects	data	collapsed	across	group.		After	data	was	collapsed,	there	were	no	significant	differences	between	interoceptive	accuracy	and	TAS-20	total	scores	in	matched	groups.			 Follow-up	t-tests	were	conducted	to	assess	patterns	of	differences	(Figure	7).		There	was	no	significant	differences	in	interoceptive	accuracy	change	in	those	with	low	alexithymia,	regardless	of	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	(t(36)	=	0.64,	p	=	.53).		In	other	words,	participants	with	low	alexithymia	show	similar	improvement	in	interoceptive	accuracy	over	the	course	of	the	experiment,	even	if	their	initial	interoceptive	accuracy	was	relatively	high.		 Those	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	(HA/LI)	at	baseline	show	improvement	in	interoceptive	accuracy	that	exceeds	the	three	other	A/I	groups:	LA/LI	group	(t(16)	=	-2.80,	p	<	.05),	the	LA/HI	group	(t(22)	=	-2.65,	p	<	.05)	and	the	HA/HI	group	(t(19)	=	-2.21,	p	<	.01).			 Unlike	all	other	interoception/TAS-20	groups,	participants	who	initially	had		
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high	alexithymia	and	high	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline	not	only	showed	no	improvement	in	interoceptive	accuracy	over	time,	they	showed	a	decline	in	accuracy.		In	this	group,	change	scores	were	significantly	smaller	than	all	other	groups	(compared	to	LA/LI,	t(35)	=	2.94,	p	<	.001;	compared	to	LA/HI:	t(37)	=	-2.50,	p	<	.05).	
	
Figure	7.		Group	differences	in	interoceptive	accuracy	(IA)	change	based	on	high	and	low	TAS-20	and	high	and	low	baseline	IA.		Bolded	lines	indicate	group	differences	with	p	<	.01;	solid	lines	depict	p	<	.05.			 Interoceptive	awareness.	Similar	methods	were	used	to	asses	whether	follow-up	measures	of	confidence	and	perceived	difficulty	predicted	TAS-20,	with	group	entered	in	the	first	step	of	the	regression	analysis	along	with	BMI.		Neither	post	measures	of	confidence	nor	perceived	difficulty	significantly	predicted	TAS-20	total.	
Task	Performance	
Overall	differences	in	alexithymia.	In	the	control	group,	TAS-20	total	was	associated	with	positive	dialecticism	(ρ	=	0.33,	p	<	.05).		In	the	meditation	group,	TAS-20	total	was	associated	with	increased	secondary	intensity	(ρ	=	0.37,	p	<	.05),	increased	total	secondary	emotions	endorsed	(ρ	=	0.57,	p	<	.001),	and	with	reduced	negative	granularity	(ρ	=	0.35,	p	<	.05).	
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Comparison	to	experiment	one.		Compared	to	experiment	one,	the	control	group	in	experiment	two	showed	reduced	target	composite	(i.e.,	reduced	frequency	of	endorsing	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	as	primary)	at	the	trend	level	(t(144)	=	-1.94,	p	<	.10).		Surprisingly,	the	control	group	was	associated	with	reduced	negative	(t(144)	=	3.40,	p	<	.01)	and	positive	granularity	(t(144)	=	5.98,	p	<	.001)	compared	to	experiment		one.		T-tests	between	other	performance	variables	are	depicted	in	Appendix	E.	Using	Fisher’s	z	transformations,	the	correlations	between	TAS-20	and	task	variables	were	compared	between	data	in	experiment	one	and	the	control	condition	in	experiment	two	(Meng,	Rosenthal	&	Rubin,	1992).	Two	significant	differences	emerged:	the	correlation	between	primary	intensity	RT	and	TAS-20	was	significantly	different	between	the	two	studies	(z	=	-2.34,	p	<	.05),	as	well	as	target	emotion	RT	and	TAS-20	at	the	trend	level	(z	=	-2.34,	p	<	.10).			To	better	understand	these	differences	in	primary	intensity	RT	and	target	emotion	RT,	participants	were	divided	into	high	and	low	TAS-20	using	a	mean	split,	and	compared	across	experiment.		For	those	with	high	alexithymia,	there	was	a	statistical	trend	for	increasing	RT	variables	from	experiment	one	to	the	control	condition	of	experiment	two	(for	primary	intensity	RT,	t(67)	=	1.88,	p	<	.10;	for	selecting	target	emotion	RT,	t(67)	=	1.81,	
p	<	.10).		For	those	with	low	alexithymia,	RT	remained	the	same	from	experiment	one	to	experiment	two.	
Overall	group	differences.	First,	repeated	measures	ANOVAS	tested	the	interaction	effect	of	emotion	category	by	group	assignment	on	performance	variables.		There	were	no	significant	interactions;	thus,	performance	variables	remained	collapsed	across	emotion	categories.	
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To	determine	the	effect	of	meditation	condition	on	performance,	main	effect	of	group	was	assessed	for	overall	performance	variables,	including:	target	emotion,	intensity	of	primary	and	secondary	emotions,	subjective	arousal,	negative	and	positive	granularity,	number	of	secondary	words	endorsed,	dialecticism,	and	RT	variables.	TAS-20	and	interoceptive	accuracy	were	split	at	their	means,	and	entered	into	the	model	to	test	for	main	effects	and	interactions.		Because	of	the	introduction	of	interoceptive	accuracy,	BMI	was	entered	as	a	covariate.	All	relationships	reported	remained	significant	when	gender	was	entered	as	a	covariate.		There	was	a	statistical	trend	for	main	effect	of	TAS-20	on	primary	intensity	(F(1,	61)	=	3.23,	p	<.10);	regardless	of	group,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	reduced	intensity	overall.			
Target	emotion.	Compared	to	experiment	one,	there	was	no	difference	in	likelihood	of	selecting	target	emotions	as	primary	in	those	with	low	and	high	alexithymia.		For	selecting	target	emotion,	there	was	a	significant	interaction	of	group	by	interoceptive	accuracy	(F(1,61)	=	4.73,	p	<	.05).		In	the	control	group,	those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy	were	significantly	less	likely	to	select	the	target	emotion	compared	to	those	with	high	interoceptive	accuracy	(t(34)	=	-2.50,	p	<	.05).		This	difference	was	not	significant	in	the	meditation	condition,	suggesting	meditation	was	effective	in	improving	normative	emotional	experiences	among	those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy.	There	was	a	significant	interaction	of	TAS-20	by	interoceptive	accuracy	(F(1,61)	=	5.00,	p	<	.05),	by	which	those	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	showed	significantly	lower	percentage	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	compared	to	those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy	and	low	alexithymia	(t(34)	=	-2.53,	p	<	.05).		These	interactions	are	visually	depicted	in	Figure	8.	
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Table	8.		Depicts	significant	interactions	related	to	selecting	target	emotion;	group	by	interoceptive	accuracy	and	interoceptive	accuracy	by	TAS-20.		Note.	IA	refers	to	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy.	*p	<	.05		
Response	time	variables.	There	were	no	main	effects	of	TAS-20	or	group	on	any	RT	variable;	however,	for	all	primary	emotion	RT	variables,	there	were	TAS-20	by	group	interaction.	This	interaction	was	significant	for	primary	intensity	RT	(F(1,61)	=	5.11,	p	<	.05),	subjective	arousal	RT	(F(1,61)	=	10.75,	p	<	.01)	and	a	statistical	trend	for	selecting	target	emotion	RT	(F(1,	61)	=	3.58,	p	<	.10).		There	was	also	a	significant	effect	of	gender	of	target	emotion	RT	(F(1,61)	=	8.39,	p	<	.01)	by	which	males	have	slower	RTs	for	identifying	primary	emotion	(mean	=	10.44,	sd	=	3.05)	compared	to	females	(mean	=	8.33,	sd	=	2.60),	similar	to	study	one.		Follow-up	t-tests	were	conducted	to	assess	patterns	of	differences	in	primary	RT	variables	between	low	and	high	alexithymia	in	control	and	meditation	groups.		For	all	interaction	effects,	there	was	a	pattern	of	slower	RT	in	the	control	condition	among	those	with	high	TAS-20	compared	to	low	TAS-20.		For	all	RT	variables,	TAS-20	was	associated	with	a	reduction	in	RT	in	the	meditation	condition.		In	the	control	group,	high	alexithymia	was	associated	with	slower	primary	intensity	RT	compared	to	those	with	low	alexithymia	(t(36)	=	-1.76,	p	<	.10).		There	was	no	difference	between	the	two	in	the	meditation	
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condition.		At	the	trend	level,	high	alexithymia	was	also	associated	with	slower	RT	to	questions	about	subjective	arousal	in	the	control	condition	(t(36)	=	-1.89,	p	<	.10),	and	faster	RT	in	the	meditation	condition	(t(36)	=	2.01,	p	<	.10).		Group	differences	in	RT	are	depicted	visually	in	Figure	9.	
																																														Group																																																													Group																																																															Group		
Figure	9.		Group	by	alexithymia	interaction	on	primary	RT	variables.	Note.		Bars	indicate	standard	error;	†	p	<	.10	for	t-tests	between	high	and	low	alexithymia.		Similar	to	primary	emotion	RT	variables,	there	was	an	interaction	effect	of	group	by	TAS-20	total	on	secondary	intensity	RT	(F(1,	61)	=	4.25,	p	<	.05),	by	which	high	alexithymia	was	associated	with	a	pattern	of	slower	RT	in	the	control	condition	compared	to	those	with	low	alexithymia,	and	compared	to	the	meditation	condition.		In	addition,	there	was	a	significant	main	effect	of	interoceptive	accuracy	on	secondary	intensity	RT.		(F(1,	61)	=	4.21,	p	<	.05),	in	which	high	interoceptive	accuracy	(mean	=	1.42s,	SD	=	0.39)	was	associated	with	slower	RT	compared	to	low	interoceptive	accuracy	(mean	=	1.59s,	SD	=	0.36);	however,	this	relationship	became	nonsignificant	when	entering	total	secondary	emotions	as	a	covariate	(p	=	.49).			
Total	secondary	words.	For	total	emotion	words	endorsed,	there	was	a	main	effect	of	group	(F(1,	61)	=	4.00,	p	<.05)	and	TAS-20	(F(1,	61)	=	4.06,	p	<	.05).			TAS-20	and	the	
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meditation	condition	were	associated	with	endorsing	a	greater	number	of	secondary	emotion	words.		There	was	a	statistical	trend	for	group	by	interoceptive	accuracy	on	total	secondary	emotions	(F(1,	61)	=	3.43,	p	<.10),	in	which	low	interoceptive	accuracy	was	associated	with	selecting	fewer	secondary	emotion	words	(mean	=	9.12,	sd	=	3.64)	compared	to	high	interoceptive	accuracy	(mean	=	11.27,	sd	=	2.33;	t(34)	=	-2.11,	p	<	.05)	in	the	control	group	only.			
Granularity.	There	was	no	main	effect	of	group	(F(1,	61)	=	0.13,	p	=	.73)	or	alexithymia	(F(1,	61)	=	0.23,	p	=	.63)	on	negative	granularity;	however,	the	interaction	between	the	two	was	significant	(F(1,	61)	=	4.07,	p	<	.05.		Follow-up	t-tests	revealed	that	in	the	control	group,	those	with	high	alexithymia	have	greater	negative	granularity	at	the	trend	level	(t(36)	=	-1.76,	p	<	.10)	compared	to	those	with	low	alexithymia.		In	the	meditation	group,	high	alexithymia	is	associated	with	lower	negative	granularity	at	the	trend	level	(t(36)	=	1.69,	p	<	.10)	compared	to	those	with	low	alexithymia.		Results	are	depicted	visually	in	figure	10.			
	
Figure	10.	Group	by	alexithymia	interaction	on	negative	granularity.		Note.		ICC	refers	to	intraclass	correlation.		†p	<	.10.		There	were	no	significant	main	effects	of	group,	TAS-20,	or	interoceptive	accuracy	on	positive	granularity;	however,	there	was	a	statistical	trend	for	a	three-way	interaction	
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(F(1,	61)	=	3.64,	p	<	.10),	depicted	in	Figure	11.		In	the	control	group,	those	with	high	TAS-20	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	were	associated	with	lower	positive	granularity	compared	to	those	with	high	TAS-20	and	high	interoceptive	accuracy	at	the	trend	level	(t(14)	=	1.94,	p	<	.10).	
	
Figure	11.	Three-way	interaction	of	group	by	TAS-20	by	interoceptive	accuracy	on	positive	granularity.		Note.		Bars	indicate	standard	error;	†	p	<	.10	for	t-tests	between	high	and	low	alexithymia.	IA	refers	to	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy.		
Dialecticism.	For	positive	dialecticism,	there	was	a	statistical	trend	for	main	effect	of	TAS-20	(F(1,	61)	=	3.32,	p	<.10).		TAS-20	was	associated	with	increased	positive	dialecticism	overall.		Positive	dialecticism	was	also	influenced	by	a	statistical	trend	for	TAS-20	by	interoceptive	accuracy	interaction	(F(1,	61)	=	4.00,	p	<.10).		Among	those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy,	those	with	high	TAS-20	showed	greater	positive	dialecticism	compared	to	those	with	low	TAS-20	(t(30)	=	2.19,	p	<	.05).		There	was	no	difference	among	those	with	high	interoceptive	accuracy.							
TAS-20	Subscales	and	Task	Performance	Spearman	correlations	were	conducted	to	consider	unique	contributions	of	each	TAS-20	subscale	and	to	facilitate	comparison	with	study	one.		A	summary	of	these	analyses	is	presented	in	Table	13.		In	the	control	condition,	DDF	was	associated	with	slower	RT	for	
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selecting	target	emotion	and	providing	primary	intensity	ratings.		EOT	was	associated	with	reduced	primary	and	secondary	intensity,	as	well	as	reduced	subjective	arousal.		There	were	no	correlations	between	DIF	and	primary	performance	variables	in	the	control	condition.		In	the	meditation	condition,	DDF	and	DIF	were	associated	with	increased	secondary	intensity,	and	correspondingly,	increased	total	secondary	emotions	endorsed.			 Control	 Meditation		 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	Target	Emotion	 -0.20	 -0.19	 -0.23	 -0.21	 -0.07	 0.16	Target	Composite	 -0.05	 -0.18	 0.16	 0.16	 0.18	 0.12	Primary	Intensity	 -0.21	 0.04	 -0.40*	 -0.08	 -0.03	 -0.16	Subjective	Arousal	 -0.09	 0.12	 -0.39*	 -0.06	 -0.15	 -0.11	Secondary	Intensity	 -0.14	 -0.03	 -0.28†	 0.33*	 0.39*	 0.02	Total	Secondary	Emotions	 -0.05	 			0.13	 -0.25	 0.46**	 0.52***	 0.22	Target	Emotion	RT	 0.49**	 0.21	 -0.04	 0.33*	 -0.03	 0.02	Primary	Intensity	RT	 0.33*	 0.15	 -0.04	 0.11	 -0.17	 -0.02	Subjective	Arousal	RT	 0.25	 0.12	 0.14	 -0.10	 -0.20	 -0.04	Secondary	Intensity	RT	 0.25	 0.17	 -0.09	 0.18	 0.03	 -0.11	
Table	13.		Spearman	correlations	between	performance	variables	and	TAS-20	subscales	for	control	and	meditation	conditions.		Note.	†p	<	.10;	*p	<	.05;	**p	<	.01;	***p	<	.001.		Follow-up	analyses	were	conducted	to	understand	the	increase	in	total	emotions	endorsed	in	the	meditation	condition.		DDF	was	correlated	with	increased	endorsements	of	positive	words	following	positive	emotion	inductions	(ρ	=	0.41,	p	<	.05)	and	positive	words	(ρ	=	0.35,	p	<	.05)	and	negative	words	(ρ	=	0.41,	p	<	.05)	following	negative	emotion	inductions.		DIF	was	significantly	correlated	with	increased	negative	words	endorsed	in	negative	categories	(ρ	=	0.42,	p	<	.01).		At	the	trend	level,	it	was	associated	with	greater	endorsements	of	positive	words	in	positive	categories	(ρ	=	0.28,	p	<	.10)	and	in	negative	categories	(ρ	=	0.30,	p	<	.10).		Neither	were	significantly	correlated	with	negative	words	
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endorsed	in	positive	categories,	highlighting	that	increased	total	secondary	emotions	contains	a	relative	lack	of	negative	dialecticism.		Spearman	correlations	were	also	conducted	to	examine	the	relationship	between	measures	of	emotional	complexity	and	TAS-20.		In	the	control	group,	TAS-20	was	associated	with	increased	positive	dialecticism	(ρ	=	0.33,	p	<	.05).		In	the	meditation	group,	TAS-20	was	associated	with	reduced	negative	dialecticism	(ρ	=	0.35,	p	<	.05).		Relationship	between	measures	of	emotional	complexity	and	TAS-20	subscales	are	depicted	in	Table	14.					 Control	 Meditation		 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	Negative	Granularity	 0.17	 0.08	 0.12	 -0.30†	 -0.37*	 -0.17	Positive	Granularity	 -0.05	 -0.09	 -0.15	 -0.16	 -0.13	 -0.11	Negative	Dialecticism	 0.11	 0.11	 0.05	 -0.16	 0.09	 -0.23	Positive	Dialecticism	 0.39*	 0.22	 -0.04	 0.02	 -0.09	 -0.15	
Table	14.		Spearman	correlations	between	emotional	complexity	and	TAS-20	subscales	for	control	and	meditation	conditions.		*p	<	.05.			 To	better	understand	the	significant	correlation	between	positive	dialecticism	and	DDF,	spearman	correlations	were	employed	to	assess	the	relationship	between	DDF	score	and	endorsements	of	the	ten	positive	emotion	words	following	negative	induction	(i.e.,	amusement,	calm,	contentment,	enthusiasm,	excitement,	happiness,	inspiration,	interest,	pride,	relief)	in	the	control	group.		There	was	a	significant	relationship	between	DDF	and	“amusement”	(ρ	=	0.32,	p	<	.05)	and	at	the	trend	level,	“relief”	(ρ	=	0.28,	p	<	.10).	
Prediction	Models.		Prediction	models	developed	in	experiment	one	were	tested	on	the	control	condition	in	experiment	two.		First,	t-tests	were	conducted	to	test	differences	in	these	two	sets	of	data	to	assess	similarity,	presented	in	Appendix	E.		Compared	to	experiment	one,	the	control	group	in	experience	two	was	associated	with	reduced	target	
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composite,	suggesting	fewer	endorsements	of	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	at	the	trend	level	(t(144)	=	-1.94,	p	<	.10).		The	control	group	was	also	associated	with	reduced	negative	(t(144)	=	-3.40,	p	<	.001)	and	positive	(t(144)	=	-5.98,	p	<	.001)	granularity	compared	to	experiment	one.		The	predictive	models	generated	in	experiment	one,	in	which	DDF	was	best	predicted	by	subjective	arousal,	DIF	by	secondary	RT	and	negative	granularity	and	EOT	by	dialecticism	and	target	composite,	were	not	significant	for	the	control	or	meditation	condition	in	the	current	study.	
Post-experiment	questions.		In	the	control	condition,	TAS-20	total	score	was	associated	with	perceiving	the	task	as	less	enjoyable	(ρ	=	0.37,	p	<	.05)	and	at	the	trend	level,	more	challenging	(ρ	=	-0.32,	p	<	.10).		In	the	meditation	group,	TAS-20	total	score	was	associated	with	perceiving	the	task	as	more	challenging	(ρ	=	-0.36,	p	<	.05).		Correlations	with	specific	subscales	are	presented	in	Table	15.			 Control	 Meditation		 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	 DDF	 DIF	 EOT	Enjoyable	 -0.28†	 -0.20	 -0.39*	 -0.14	 -0.05	 -0.13	Challenging	 0.32†	 0.30†	 0.19	 0.36*	 0.26	 0.23	
Table	15.	Post-experiment	questions	about	task	enjoyment	and	challenge.		Note.	†p	<	.10;	
	*p	<	.05.	
	
Discussion	Experiment	two	reveals	interesting	relationships	between	alexithymia	and	measures	of	interoceptive	awareness:	the	two	are	quadratically	related,	with	relatively	low	and	relatively	high	interoceptive	accuracy	predicting	heightened	alexithymia.		Compared	to	the	predictive	models	generated	in	experiment	one,	these	models	consistently	predicted	variance	in	each	TAS-20	subscale,	and	to	a	greater	extent.		Alexithymia	and	interoceptive	awareness	affect	performance	in	conjunction,	and	differently	following	meditation	or	
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control	task.	Predictive	models	from	experiment	one	did	not	replicate	in	this	study;	it	may	be	that	relatively	short	and	simple	interventions,	such	as	asking	individuals	to	attend	to	their	heart	beat	or	providing	a	period	of	relaxation,	normalize	aspects	of	emotional	processing	in	alexithymia.	Overall,	mindfulness	meditation	was	successful	in	improving	some	aspects	of	performance	among	those	with	elevated	alexithymia,	including	response	time	and	positive	granularity,	though	other	deficits	remained.	
Interoception	Replicating	previous	results	(Herbert	et	al.,	2011),	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline	significantly	predicts	TAS-20.		In	the	current	sample,	TAS-20	total	and	all	subscales	were	quadratically	related	to	interoceptive	accuracy;	thus,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	either	relatively	low	or	high	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline.		Importantly,	interoceptive	accuracy	predicted	all	three	subscales	of	alexithymia,	unlike	other	measures	of	performance	in	the	current	study.		This	pattern	supports	theories	that	abnormalities	in	interoceptive	awareness	are	a	core	feature	of	alexithymia.		 These	findings	contribute	significantly	to	debate	in	the	alexithymia	literature	regarding	the	role	of	interoception.		Some	argue	that	alexithymia	is	in	fact,	at	its	core,	a	deficit	in	interoceptive	awareness,	preventing	the	formulation	of	subjective	feelings	states	(e.g.,	Bird	et	al.,	2010;	Herbert	&	Pollatos,	2012;	Silani	et	al.,	2008).		Others	argue	alexithymia	is	associated	with	hyperfocus	on	interoceptive	signals,	leading	to	somatic	symptom	disorders	and	other	medical	conditions	(Taylor	et	al.,	1997;	Lumley	et	al.,	2007).		Current	findings	suggest	the	presence	of	two	subgroups	of	alexithymia:	one	group	marked	by	low	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline,	and	the	other	with	heightened	accuracy.		The	two	opposing	accounts	of	how	interoception	and	alexithymia	relate	may	account	for	
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these	differing	subtypes.		Low	accuracy	may	limit	awareness	of	somatosensory	correlates	of	an	emotional	experience,	preventing	the	development	of	conscious	subjective	emotional	states	(Critchley	et	al.,	2004)	which	may	contribute	to	alexithymia	and	its	problematic	correlates	(Herbert	&	Pollatos,	2012).		Alternatively,	heightened	interoceptive	accuracy	may	promote	over-amplification	of	physiological	sensations,	distracting	from	their	emotional	relevance.	For	example,	an	individual	might	interpret	the	physiological	components	of	emotional	experience	as	signs	of	physical	illness	(Taylor	&	Bagby,	2004;	Panayiotuo	et	al.,	2015;	e.g.,	attribute	“butterflies	in	my	stomach”	to	stomach	ache).		This	may	subvert	normal	range	awareness	of	that	emotion,	limiting	appropriate	subsequent	action.		The	latter	case	may	characterize	somatization	disorders,	which	are	associated	with	heightened	sensitivity	to	visceral	cues,	as	well	as	elevated	alexithymia	(Taylor	et	al.,	1997;	Katz	et	al.,	2009).		Those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy	and	high	alexithymia	at	baseline	showed	significantly	greater	improvement	in	interoceptive	accuracy	than	all	other	groups,	regardless	of	meditation	or	control	group	assignment;	thus,	this	subgroup	is	capable	of	being	trained	to	pay	more	attention	to	internal	stimuli.		Panayiotou	et	al.	(2015)	argue	that	problematic	correlates	of	alexithymia	(e.g.,	somatization,	depression)	emerge	from	a	learned	tendency	to	avoid	interoceptive	cues	and	subjective	experiences	that	accompany	negative	affect;	they	show	that	avoidance	mediates	the	relationship	between	alexithymia	and	various	clinical	populations.	The	subset	of	individuals	with	heightened	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	might	possess	the	capacity	to	attend	to	internal	stimuli	but	a	reduced	tendency,	or	even	avoidance,	to	do	so,	resulting	in	low	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	observed	in	the	current	study.		This	may	contribute	to	atypical	subjective	
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experiences	of	emotion	states.	This	group	may	particularly	benefit	from	interventions	designed	to	increase	awareness	of	bodily	states.	In	the	current	study,	this	group	was	associated	with	greater	atypical	patterns	of	emotional	processing	compared	to	those	with	high	alexithymia	and	high	interoceptive	accuracy.		Specifically,	this	subgroup	was	relatively	less	likely	to	select	the	target	emotion	as	primary	and	demonstrated	reduced	positive	granularity	as	well	as	increased	positive	dialecticism	(which	as	explained	later,	may	be	problematic).		Similar	deficits	were	not	observed	among	individuals	with	heightened	alexithymia	and	good	interoceptive	accuracy,	suggesting	high	interoceptive	accuracy	may	preserve	aspects	of	emotional	processing	in	those	with	heightened	alexithymia.	In	addition	to	improvements	in	interoceptive	accuracy,	those	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	also	show	improvement	in	positive	granularity	in	response	to	meditation.		This	subgroup	may	particularly	benefit	from	body-focused	interventions,	that	increase	attention	to	internal	stimuli.		Individuals	with	high	alexithymia	and	high	interoceptive	accuracy	on	the	other	hand,	may	not	benefit	from	such	interventions;	they	already	have	high	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy,	and	are	resistant	to	improvement	in	interoceptive	accuracy	over	time,	in	contrast	to	their	high	interoceptive	accuracy	counterparts	with	low	alexithymia.		High	baseline	accuracy,	as	well	as	resistance	to	improvement,	may	reflect	a	baseline	tendency	to	hyper-focus	on	internal	sensations.		These	individuals	were	not	associated	with	the	same	patterns	of	abnormal	emotional	processing	evident	in	those	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy.		This	group	may	more	likely	be	associated	with	problematic	patterns	of	thinking	about	physiological	sensations,	such	as	somatosensory	amplification	(Karlsson	et	al.,	2008)	
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or	catastrophic	thinking	about	physiological	cues,	to	the	detriment	of	their	physical	health.		Future	research	should	investigate	whether	this	profile	characterizes	individuals	with	heightened	alexithymia	and	somatic	symptoms	disorders.		If	so,	they	may	benefit	most	from	cognitive	strategies	designed	to	reduce	maladaptive	appraisals	of	interoceptive	signals	(e.g.,	Gaylord	et	al.	2011;	Garland	et	al.,	2012).	
Differences	in	Experiment	One	and	Experiment	Two	It	was	expected	that	the	control	condition	in	experiment	two	would	show	results	similar	to	experiment	one;	however,	that	was	not	the	case.		The	predictive	patterns	generated	in	experiment	one	did	not	predict	alexithymia	subscales	in	the	control	condition	in	experiment	two.		Overall	patterns	of	relationships	between	performance	and	alexithymia	also	differed.	In	the	control	condition,	TAS-20	total	score	was	only	associated	with	increased	positive	dialecticism.		Compared	to	experiment	one,	there	were	significant	differences	in	response	time	variables;	in	experiment	two,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	slower	response	time.	Though	the	emotion	task	was	the	same	in	experiment	two,	other	experimental	parameters	could	have	influenced	performance.		Supporting	this	possibility	is	the	finding	that	both	groups	showed	comparable	increases	in	interoceptive	accuracy	over	the	course	of	the	study.		Compared	to	experiment	one,	participants	in	the	control	group	showed	reduced	selection	of	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	as	primary,	suggesting	parameters	of	experiment	two	may	have	improved	awareness	of	emotional	cues,	facilitating	access	to	conceptual	information	about	emotional	states.	Various	factors	could	have	influenced	performance	in	experiment	two.	Participants	were	instructed	to	attend	to	and	evaluate	their	heartbeat	for	about	three	minutes	prior	to	
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completing	the	emotions	task	during	the	heartbeat	detection	trial.		Asking	participants	to	count	their	heartbeats	may	have	prompted	greater	awareness	of	internal	states.		Constantinou	et	al.	(2014)	present	participants	with	emotional	imagery	scripts	and	instruct	them	to	engage	in	either	shallow	(i.e.,	focusing	on	visual	aspects	of	the	image)	or	deep	emotional	processing.		In	the	deep	emotional	processing	condition,	participants	were	instructed	to	attend	to	other	imagined	experiences,	including	bodily	changes.		This	relatively	short	and	simple	manipulation	resulted	in	improvements	in	multiple	emotional	domains	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia;	attention	to	heartbeat	prior	to	completing	the	emotion	induction	task	may	have	similarly	normalized	deficits	in	the	current	study.		Participants	in	experiment	two	also	wore	a	heart	rate	monitor	around	their	chest	through	the	duration	of	the	task.		This	could	have	prompted	ongoing	awareness	of	internal	states,	particularly	as	simple	self-referential	stimuli,	such	as	a	mirror	or	personally	relevant	words,	improve	interoceptive	accuracy	(Ainley	et	al.,	2012;	Ainley	et	al.,	2013).			The	control	condition	in	experiment	two	also	differed	from	experiment	one	in	its	provision	of	a	ten-minute	control	recording.	In	its	original	study,	the	control	recording	was	described	as	“neutral,	but	relaxing”	(Cropley	et	al.,	2007).		A	brief	period	of	relaxation	can	have	benefits	similar	to	mindfulness	meditation	(e.g.,	Jain	et	al.,	2007)	which	could	have	influenced	performance	in	the	control	group.		Either	through	relaxation,	increasing	attention	towards	interoceptive	stimuli,	or	a	combination	of	the	two,	experimental	parameters	seem	to	have	improved	performance	from	experiment	one	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia.		These	changes	may	be	particularly	salient	to	individuals	who	do	not	naturally	attend	to	such	signals	(e.g.,	those	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline).	
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Performance	Variables	in	Control	versus	Meditation	Group	In	the	control	group,	alexithymia	was	only	associated	with	increased	positive	dialecticism,	driven	primarily	by	DDF.		DDF	was	also	associated	with	slower	response	times	for	target	emotion	and	primary	intensity.		EOT	was	negatively	correlated	with	subjective	arousal	and	intensity.	Patterns	of	responding	differed	in	the	meditation	group,	in	which	total	alexithymia	was	associated	with	increased	total	secondary	words,	and	correspondingly,	increased	secondary	intensity.		Notably,	though	alexithymia	was	associated	with	increased	negative	and	positive	words	across	positive	and	negative	inductions	(congruent	and	incongruent),	it	was	not	associated	with	increased	negative	words	following	a	positive	induction	(i.e.,	negative	dialecticism).		Increased	secondary	words	was	driven	by	DDF	and	DDF,	which	were	correspondingly	associated	with	greater	secondary	intensity	and	reduced	negative	granularity.		DDF	was	also	associated	with	slower	response	times	for	questions	about	primary	emotion.			There	were	no	associateions	between	EOT	and	performance	variables	in	the	meditation	condition.		Additional	group	differences	in	total	alexithymia	emerged	when	considering	the	interaction	effect	of	high	or	low	alexithymia	as	well	as	high	or	low	interoceptive	accuracy.	
Primary	intensity	and	arousal.	Those	with	high	alexithymia	reported	decreased	primary	intensity	regardless	of	group	or	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy.		In	the	control	condition,	this	was	especially	true	for	EOT.		EOT	was	also	associated	with	reduced	subjective	arousal	in	the	control	condition.		Reduced	intensity	and	arousal	is	consistent	with	the	notion	that	at	baseline,	an	externally	oriented	cognitive	style	reduces	awareness	of	autonomic	correlates	of	emotional	experiences.		These	were	the	only	deficits	associated	with	EOT	in	experiment	two,	which	notably,	were	not	present	in	the	meditation	condition.		
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Meditation	may	function	to	increase	awareness	of	these	aspects	of	emotional	experiences,	though	some	deficit	remains.	There	were	no	overall	group	findings	for	subjective	arousal.		Though	decreased	subjective	arousal	was	the	best	predictor	of	DDF	in	experiment	one,	it	was	not	correlated	with	DDF	in	the	control	or	meditation	condition	in	experiment	two.		Intervention-like	qualities	of	the	control	condition	may	have	been	sufficient	to	increase	awareness	of	autonomic	signals	among	those	with	elevated	DDF	and	DIF,	normalizing	report	of	subjective	arousal.	This	is	consistent	with	the	theory	that	at	baseline,	alexithymia	is	associated	with	reduced	attention	to	interoceptive	aspects	of	emotions	(Panayiotou	et	al.,	2015),	and	suggests	attention	towards	such	stimuli	can	be	trained	using	simple	interventions,	especially	for	those	with	elevated	DDF	and	DIF.		Remaining	deficits	in	intensity	and	arousal	for	EOT	in	the	control	condition	(but	not	meditation	condition)	suggest	EOT	may	require	more	intensive	remediation	to	increase	awareness,	consistent	with	findings	that	EOT	is	more	resistant	to	intervention	than	DDF	and	DIF	(cf.	Cameron	et	al.,	2014).	Differences	from	experiment	one	to	experiment	two	demonstrate	how	small	changes	in	experimental	design	can	alter	subjective	arousal,	adding	to	a	body	of	vast	inconsistencies	regarding	this	aspect	of	emotional	processing	in	alexithymia	(Bausch	et	al.,	2001;	Constantinou	et	al.,	2014;	Eastabrook	et	al.,	2013;	Friedlander	et	al.,	1997;	Infrasca,	1997;	Peasley-Miklus	et	al.,	2015;	Pollatos	et	al.,	2008;	Roedema	&	Simons,	1999;	Stone	&	Nielson	2001).	
Target	emotion.	There	was	a	significant	decrease	in	target	composite	in	experiment	two.		Although	target	composite	was	a	primary	predictor	of	EOT	in	experiment	
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one,	there	were	no	correlations	between	target	composite	and	TAS-20	or	any	of	its	subscales	in	the	control	or	meditation	condition	in	the	current	experiment.		There	were	also	no	relationships	between	alexithymia	and	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	overall	in	the	current	study,	nor	was	there	an	effect	of	alexithymia	on	total	average	non-primary	emotions	endorsed	overall.		Experimental	parameters	in	experiment	two	may	have	served	to	normalize	performance.		For	example,	the	heartbeat	detection	task	may	have	increased	one’s	awareness	of	somatosensory	correlates	of	emotional	states,	facilitating	access	to	emotional	concepts	that	were	inaccessible	in	experiment	two.	In	fact,	interoceptive	accuracy	did	promote	normative	emotional	labeling	overall,	especially	for	individuals	with	high	alexithymia.		Those	with	high	alexithymia	and	high	interoceptive	accuracy	show	similar	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion	as	those	with	low	alexithymia.		With	reduced	awareness	of	both	subjective	and	somatosensory	correlates	of	emotion,	those	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	show	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion.		Intact	awareness	of	internal	cues	or	subjective	cues	may	be	sufficient	to	normalize	selection	of	primary	emotion	among	others.		Importantly,	mindfulness	meditation	appears	to	promote	selection	of	the	target	emotion	among	those	with	low	interoceptive	awareness	at	baseline,	suggesting	awareness	of	internal	cues	can	be	trained	and	harnessed	to	normalize	emotional	processing.		
Response	time.	In	the	control	condition,	alexithymia	was	generally	associated	with	slower	response	timess	to	questions	about	emotional	experiences	in	the	control	condition,	particularly	DDF.		Compared	to	experiment	one,	those	with	elevated	alexithymia	showed	a	significant	increase	in	response	time,	whereas	those	with	low	alexithymia	remained	the	same.		In	the	meditation	condition,	those	with	elevated	alexithymia	showed	a	decrease	in	
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response	time	similar	to	individuals	with	low	alexithymia.	Experimental	parameters	may	have	contributed	to	increased	awareness	of	mixed-emotion	or	increased	time	spent	contemplating	emotional	states,	both	of	which	might	lead	to	increased	response	time.	In	the	control	condition,	faster	response	times	among	those	with	low	alexithymia	may	reflect	greater	emotional	clarity,	as	well	as	a	“normative”	degree	of	time	spent	contemplating	evaluations	given	their	respective	ambiguity.		In	the	absence	of	intervention-like	features	in	experiment	one,	faster	response	times	in	alexithymia	may	reflect	reduced	experience	of	mixed-emotion	and	possibly,	reduced	time	spent	contemplating	on	subjective	experiences	(see	experiment	one	discussion	for	additional	interpretation).	In	the	same	way	the	control	condition	appears	to	have	increased	awareness	of	intensity	and	subjective	arousal,	it	may	also	have	increased	awareness	of	mixed-emotional	states	or	prompted	additional	contemplation	of	internal	states.		Supporting	the	possibility	that	the	control	condition	increased	awareness	of	mixed-emotion	is	the	finding	that	alexithymia	was	associated	with	increased	positive	dialecticism.	Abnormal	patterns	of	intensity	and	target	emotion	response	times	were	not	apparent	in	the	meditation	condition,	in	which	high	alexithymia	was	associated	with	a	decrease	in	response	time	comparable	to	response	times	of	those	with	low	alexithymia.	Meditation	may	be	successful	in	improving	emotional	clarity	and	awareness	of	mixed-emotion	is	those	with	heighted	alexithymia.		Correspondingly,	there	were	no	relationships	between	TAS-20	subscales	and	dialecticism	in	the	meditation	condition.		There	were	no	positive	relationships	between	interoceptive	accuracy	and	response	time	for	questions	about	subjective	arousal	or	any	other	variable,	suggesting	response	time	should	not	be	
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used	as	an	index	of	interoceptive	accuracy	as	it	has	been	in	the	past	(e.g.,	Silverstein	et	al.,	2011).	Little	research	has	assessed	the	relationship	between	response	time	and	measures	of	alexithymia	and	related	constructs,	and	existing	data	is	mixed.		More	work	is	needed	in	this	area	to	clarify	the	role	of	response	time	in	the	experience	of	emotions;	for	example,	clarifying	the	(likely	non-linear)	relationship	between	response	time	and	adaptive	emotional	processing.		Such	work	would	shed	light	on	differences	observed	in	the	relationship	between	alexithymia	and	response	time	in	experiment	one	and	two,	and	how	the	differing	tasks	might	have	contributed	to	changes.	
Emotional	complexity.		Granularity.	Though	alexithymia	was	associated	with	reduced	negative	granularity	in	experiment	one,	there	were	no	relationships	between	alexithymia	and	negative	granularity	in	the	control	condition	of	experiment	two.		Experimental	parameters	may	have	normalized	negative	granularity	in	the	control	group,	though	deficits	re-emerged	following	meditation,	from	which	individuals	with	low	alexithymia	may	derive	greater	benefit.		Whereas	meditation	appears	to	improve	negative	granularity	among	those	with	low	alexithymia,	those	with	high	alexithymia	show	a	decrease	from	control	to	meditation	condition.		In	experiment	one,	granularity	was	associated	with	reduced	total	secondary	emotions	endorsed.		Though	not	significant	in	the	current	study,	increased	number	of	secondary	words	endorsed	in	the	meditation	condition	may	also	reflect	a	trend	towards	reduced	granularity.		Mindfulness	meditation,	at	least	in	the	dose	provided	in	the	current	study,	may	be	ineffective	for	increasing	granularity	in	individuals	with	heightened	alexithymia.	
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The	meditation	condition	was	successful	in	improving	positive	granularity	among	individuals	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy.		This	serves	as	additional	evidence	that	mindfulness	meditation	may	be	ideally	suited	to	alleviate	deficits	associated	with	reduced	interoceptive	accuracy.		It	highlights	the	importance	of	bodily	awareness	for	promoting	positive	granularity,	in	contrast	to	negative	granularity,	which	was	not	influenced	by	interoceptive	accuracy.		In	experiment	one,	positive	granularity	was	not	associated	with	any	performance	measures,	whereas	negative	granularity	was	correlated	with	many.		Current	results	suggest	interoceptive	awareness	is	key	in	the	experience	of	positive	granularity,	further	supporting	the	possibility	that	different	mechanisms	are	responsible	for	the	generation	of	positive	and	negative	granularity.	
Dialecticism.	Though	negative	dialecticism	was	an	important	predictor	variable	in	experiment	one,	it	was	not	related	to	TAS-20	in	experiment	two.		Surprisingly,	alexithymia	was	associated	with	greater	positive	dialecticism,	particularly	in	the	control	group	and	among	those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy.		Though	the	ability	to	recognize	positive	emotions	in	a	state	of	negative	affect	is	important,	the	current	study	depicted	clips	designed	to	induce	intense,	negative,	and	relatively	discrete	affective	states	(e.g.,	death	scenes,	interpersonal	violence),	not	ideally	suited	to	elicit	positive	dialecticism	(see	discussion	of	experiment	one	for	further	elaboration).	Given	the	nature	of	these	videos,	it	is	likely	that	increased	dialecticism	in	the	control	condition	is	not	adaptive.		Consistently,	positive	dialecticism	was	associated	with	reduced	likelihood	of	selecting	the	target	emotion.		In	the	current	study,	increased	positive	dialecticism	was	driven	by	increased	endorsements	of	“relief”	and	“amusement”	following	negative	emotion	inductions.	Increased	endorsements	of	“amusement”	could	reflect	
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simplistic	emotional	concepts	following	positive	inducing	clips	(e.g.,	“films	are	amusing”).		Increased	endorsements	of	relief	may	reflect	reduced	distress	tolerance	of	negative	affective	states.		Future	studies	presenting	more	ambiguous	stimuli	is	a	critical	next	step	in	this	field	to	further	parse	the	role	of	dialecticism	in	alexithymia.		 No	significant	relationships	between	alexithymia	and	negative	dialecticism	were	observed	in	the	current	study,	consistent	with	the	notion	that	the	intervention	properties	present	in	both	conditions	increased	access	to	greater	information	about	emotional	states	in	those	with	heightened	alexithymia,	facilitating	awareness	of	the	experience	of	negative	emotions	following	a	positive	emotion	induction.		Though	notably,	alexithymia	was	not	associated	with	an	increase	in	negative	words	following	positive	inductions	compared	to	all	other	combination	of	positive	and	negative	affective	words	and	inductions.	Nevertheless,	negative	dialecticism	appears	to	have	improved	from	experiment	one,	which	in	the	current	paradigm,	is	a	better	indicator	of	adaptive	emotional	processing	compared	to	positive	dialecticism.	
Limitations	Limitations	detailed	in	experiment	one	apply	as	well	to	experiment	two.		The	provision	of	labels	and	emotion	inductions	selected	to	elicit	relatively	discrete	and	prototypical	emotional	experiences	were	essential	first	steps,	though	inherently	limiting.		Along	the	same	lines,	the	current	study	provided	ample	contextual	cues	that	could	have	facilitated	access	to	emotional	concepts	and	altered	performance.		Experience	sampling	methods	are	a	critical	next	step	in	understanding	how	emotional	experiences	are	altered	in	daily	life,	and	to	obtain	more	valid	measures	of	emotional	granularity.		Depressive	
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symptoms	and	baseline	response	time	were	also	not	collected	in	experiment	two,	and	would	have	benefited	interpretation	of	findings,	particularly	for	response	time	variables.		 	Experiment	two	was	limited	by	its	sample	size.		Sample	size	was	30%	smaller	than	experiment	one,	and	even	smaller	when	divided	into	control	versus	meditation	group.		This	limits	comparison	of	findings	between	experiment	one	and	experiment	two.	Power	was	further	reduced	for	ANOVA	analyses	that	considered	the	role	of	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	in	addition	to	group	assignment	and	level	of	TAS-20	score.			 Reliance	on	Schandry’s	(1981)	heartbeat	tracking	task	is	a	limitation.	Heartbeat	tracking	tasks	like	Schandry’s	(1981)	have	been	criticized	for	their	methodological	limitations	(see	Reed,	Harver,	&	Katkin,	1990),	particularly	as	participants	can	estimate	their	heartbeat	in	the	absence	of	interoceptive	signals.		However,	heartbeat	tracking	tasks	are	feasible	and	accessible,	and	remain	the	most	common	methods	of	assessing	interoceptive	accuracy	(Kleckner	et	al.,	2015).		The	current	study	attempted	to	tackle	some	limitations	of	this	methodology	by	assessing	confidence	and	difficulty	ratings	in	addition	to	accuracy,	and	found	that	confidence	predicts	alexithymia	as	well	as	accuracy.				 A	clear	limitation,	as	detailed	throughout	this	discussion	section,	are	the	apparent	intervention-like	properties	of	the	study,	particularly	within	the	control	condition.	Instructing	participants	to	attend	to	their	internal	stimuli	likely	altered	interoceptive	awareness	throughout	the	study,	as	well	as	the	provision	of	an	interoceptive	cue	–	a	heartrate	monitor	worn	throughout	the	duration	of	the	experiment.		In	the	control	condition,	the	control	script	had	relaxation	properties	that	might	have	had	benefits	similar	to	a	brief	mindfulness	meditation	script	(Jain	et	al.,	2007).		Again,	this	makes	it	challenging	to	compare	results	of	experiment	one	and	two,	as	was	the	original	goal.	
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The	meditation	script	itself	may	have	been	limiting.		Though	selected	because	it	was	validated	in	another	laboratory-based	design	(Coffey	et	al.,	2007),	it	may	not	have	been	ideal.		It	was	delivered	in	a	dark	room	via	headphones	and	was	recorded	in	a	British	accent.		Had	the	script	been	delivered	in	person	(similar	to	classical	mindfulness	trainings;	Kabat-Zinn,	1990),	or	had	been	individualized	for	the	present	study	using	a	familiar	accent,	it	may	have	had	a	stronger	effect	on	performance.		Many	studies	show	improved	interoceptive	accuracy	in	response	to	mindfulness	meditation	(Farb,	Segal,	&	Anderson,	2013;	Hölzel	et	al.,	2008;	Lazar	et	al.,	2005);	however,	these	studies	are	done	in	long-term	meditators,	or	in	individuals	following	long-term	mindfulness	intervention.		A	ten-minute	meditation	almost	certainly	underestimates	the	potential	benefits	of	a	long-term	intervention.	
Conclusion	This	experiment	in	the	first	is	the	literature	to	show	different	subtypes	of	individuals	with	elevated	alexithymia	based	on	interoceptive	accuracy.		Elevated	alexithymia	was	characterized	by	either	relatively	high	or	relatively	low	interoceptive	accuracy;	those	with	high	interoceptive	accuracy	showed	fewer	deficits	in	emotional	processing	overall,	whereas	those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy	gained	more	benefit	from	a	mindfulness	meditation.	Those	with	low	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline	showed	a	dramatic	improvement	in	interoceptive	accuracy	from	baseline	to	follow-up,	suggesting	attention	towards	internal	stimuli	can	be	trained	in	this	population.	These	findings	provide	a	platform	for	future	investigations	of	alexithymia.		It	is	very	likely	that	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia,	baseline	interoceptive	accuracy	corresponds	differentially	to	clinical	profiles	and	responds	differently	to	intervention.	For	example,	those	with	elevated	alexithymia	and	high	interoceptive	accuracy	may	be	
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particularly	prone	to	the	development	of	somatic	symptom	disorders.		Because	this	group	has	high	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline,	they	will	likely	benefit	less	from	body-focused	interventions.		Though	deficits	similar	to	those	in	experiment	one	did	not	emerge	as	hypothesized,	it	is	promising	that	performance	improved	in	a	number	of	domains	in	the	control	group	compared	to	experiment	one.		It	suggests	that	with	even	simple	manipulations,	such	as	introduction	of	a	relaxation	period	and	prompting	attention	towards	heartbeat,	performance	measures	can	be	improved.		 	
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CHAPTER	IV	
General	Discussion	Study	one	presents	a	novel	laboratory-based	design	capable	of	measuring	a	variety	of	subjective,	implicit	and	complex	emotional	processes.		It	brings	diverse	measurements	to	the	forefront	of	understanding	the	alexithymia	construct,	many	of	which	have	been	minimally	studied	in	this	field,	including	dialecticism,	granularity	and	response	time.		This	study	can	be	easily	adapted	to	address	a	number	of	follow-up	research	questions.		 Study	two	speaks	to	the	importance	of	interoceptive	awareness	for	understanding	deficits	associated	with	alexithymia.		Normative	performance	in	a	number	of	domains	was	preserved	in	individuals	with	heightened	alexithymia	and	good	interoceptive	awareness.		It	may	be	that	in	the	absence	of	subjective	emotional	awareness,	interoceptive	cues	help	fill	in	the	gaps	of	one’s	emotional	experience.	Future	studies	should	investigate	if	and	how	differing	alexithymia/interoception	profiles	map	on	to	various	clinical	populations.		Alexithymia	with	heightened	interoceptive	accuracy	may	best	characterize	individuals	with	somatic	symptom	or	other	medical	conditions.		 Differing	subtypes	of	alexithymia	and	interoception	will	likely	respond	differently	to	psychosocial	interventions.		In	the	current	study,	mindfulness	meditation	was	successful	in	improving	positive	granularity	and	selection	of	the	target	emotion	among	those	with	low	interoceptive	awareness.		This	group	may	particularly	benefit	from	body-focused	interventions,	such	as	mindfulness	meditation,	whereas	those	with	high	interoceptive	accuracy	may	benefit	from	other	interventions.		Identifying	clinical	profiles	of	each	subtype	is	critical	for	guiding	future	clinical	recommendations.	
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	 Even	in	response	to	the	control	condition,	alexithymia	showed	improvements	in	performance	compared	to	experiment	one.		This	finding	highlights	the	malleability	of	emotional	processing	in	alexithymia,	and	suggests	that	deficits	can	be	improved	with	targeted	interventions.	Those	with	high	alexithymia	and	low	interoceptive	accuracy	at	baseline	showed	dramatic	improvement	in	interoceptive	accuracy	at	follow-up,	regardless	of	condition.		Instructing	participants	to	attend	to	their	heartbeat,	as	well	as	providing	a	period	of	relaxation	or	meditation	may	increase	awareness	of	somatosensory	and	subjective	correlates	of	emotional	experiences,	normalizing	selection	of	the	target	emotion	and	awareness	of	mixed-emotional	states.	Consequently,	there	was	a	significant	reduction	of	endorsements	of	“no	emotion”	and	“confusion”	in	experiment	two,	and	among	those	with	alexithymia,	increased	response	time,	which	may	reflect	increased	awareness	of	mixed	emotional	states.		Correspondingly,	there	were	no	significant	relationships	between	TAS-20	and	negative	dialecticism	in	experiment	two,	though	this	was	an	important	predictor	of	EOT	in	experiment	one.		 The	meditation	condition	was	successful	in	reducing	remaining	deficits	in	subjective	arousal	and	intensity	in	those	with	elevated	EOT;	in	fact,	there	were	no	significant	associations	between	task	performance	and	the	EOT	subscale	in	the	meditation	condition.		This	is	particularly	important,	as	EOT	shows	greater	resistance	to	psychological	intervention	(Cameron	et	al.,	2014;	Páez	et	al.,	1999).		Furthermore,	EOT	was	not	associated	with	reduced	enjoyment	of	the	meditation	task,	unlike	experiment	one	and	the	control	condition	of	experiment	two,	suggesting	this	particularly	approach	may	not	be	aversive.		With	targeted	intervention	approaches,	deficits	associated	with	EOT	may	be	remediated.		Meditation	was	also	successful	in	normalizing	response	time	compared	to	the	
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control	condition	in	those	with	heightened	alexithymia,	reflecting	increased	emotional	clarity	(Lischetzke	et	al.,	2005;	2011).		 Though	meditation	may	have	improved	awareness	of	emotional	signals,	such	as	subjective	arousal	and	the	presence	of	mixed	emotions,	it	was	not	successful	in	improving	negative	granularity	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia.		Whereas	those	with	low	alexithymia	showed	improvement	in	negative	granularity	from	control	group	to	meditation	group,	those	with	heightened	alexithymia	got	worse.		It	is	particularly	important	to	parse	the	role	of	negative	granularity	in	alexithymia,	as	it	might	represent	a	mechanism	by	which	alexithymia	relates	to	deficits	in	emotion	regulation	(or	vice	versa).	Negative	granularity	was	particularly	low	in	individuals	with	heightened	DDF	and	DIF.	As	a	more	complex	aspect	of	emotional	experience,	one	that	is	cultivated	over	time	(Carstensen	et	al.,	2000;	Widen	&	Russell,	2008),	a	short	mindfulness	meditation	may	not	be	sufficient	to	increase	levels	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia.	Importantly,	there	were	no	overall	relationships	between	TAS-20	subscales	and	positive	granularity		in	either	experiment;	this	suggests	a	degree	of	granularity	is	intact,	which	may	indicate	potential	for	increasing	negative	granularity	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia.	It	is	important	future	studies	determine	whether	granularity	in	alexithymia	is	malleable	and	how	to	best	target	it	through	intervention.				 The	current	study	clearly	demonstrates	potential	for	improvement	among	atypical	emotional	experiences	in	alexithymia,	even	through	very	simple	interventions.	Though	multiple	reviews	highlight	the	value	of	intervention	for	reducing	alexithymia	(Cameron	et	al.,	2014;	Pinna	et	al.,	2015),	they	disclaim	that	in	many	cases,	interventions	are	ineffective	or	less	effective	for	those	with	heightened	alexithymia,	and	that	even	when	relative	levels	
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of	alexithymia	are	reduced,	psychopathological	features	may	remain.		Interventions	may	need	to	be	carefully	tailored	to	best	address	the	needs	of	those	with	alexithymia.		Morie	et	al.	(2015)	provide	interesting	evidence	that	under	the	right	circumstances,	alexithymia	may	enhance	the	properties	of	a	psychosocial	intervention.			
Future	Directions	The	results	of	this	study	pave	many	avenues	for	future	research.		First,	the	present	study	should	be	validated	without	the	manipulations	present	in	experiment	two.		Future	studies	should	replicate	this	task	using	free	response	design	to	elicit	information	about	emotional	experiences.		Nook	et	al.	(2015)	show	that	providing	emotion	labels	has	a	restorative	effect	on	emotion	recognition	deficits	in	alexithymia.		It	would	be	interesting	to	see	how	the	absence	of	labels	affects	performance	in	the	current	task,	and	whether	the	presence	of	labels	has	an	intervention	effect	of	increasing	access	to	conceptual	knowledge	about	one’s	own	internal	emotional	experiences.		Additionally,	the	absence	of	labels	would	provide	a	more	ecologically	valid	perspective	of	emotion	labeling	in	alexithymia.	Experience	sampling	methods	should	be	employed	to	continue	investigating	these	traits	in	alexithymia.		Emotion	granularity	emerged	as	an	important	predictor	variable	in	the	current	study,	and	may	have	important	implications	for	understanding	and	intervening	on	emotion	regulation	deficits	in	this	population.	Experience	sampling	methods	would	allow	more	classical	investigation	of	granularity	in	this	population	(Barrett	et	al.,	2001;	Tugade	et	al.,	2004).		Additionally,	they	would	facilitate	parsing	the	ability	to	engage	in	emotional	awareness	from	tendency	to	do	so	in	every	day	life	in	alexithymia,	which	is	difficult	to	assess	in	a	laboratory-based	setting.	
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	 Future	studies	should	also	utilize	more	ambiguous	stimuli,	such	as	those	employed	in	Lischetzke	et	al.	(2005),	and	less	intense	stimuli.	In	particular,	future	studies	would	benefit	from	more	ambiguous	negative	inductions,	as	videos	employed	in	the	current	study	are	relatively	discrete.		More	ambiguous	and	less	intense	emotional	experiences	are	more	reflective	of	daily	life,	would	likely	be	more	sensitive	to	group	differences,	and	less	likely	to	be	influenced	by	external	knowledge	of	emotional	states.		This	would	also	allow	better	investigation	of	dialecticism	in	alexithymia.				 As	an	important	predictor	of	alexithymia,	future	studies	should	consider	incorporating	measures	of	interoceptive	awareness.		In	particular,	studies	should	consider	what	combination	of	alexithymia	and	interoceptive	accuracy	best	characterize	various	clinical	diagnoses,	and	test	the	hypothesis	that	high	interoceptive	awareness	best	characterizes	somatic	symptoms	disorder.	
Conclusions	
	 The	current	study	shows	that	at	baseline,	reduced	subjective	arousal,	greater	frequency	of	reporting	experiencing	“no	emotion”	or	“confusion”	following	a	relatively	intense	and	prototypical	emotion	induction,	and	reduced	aspects	of	negative	granularity	are	most	predictive	of	alexithymia.		In	addition,	interoceptive	accuracy	has	important	implications	for	behavioral	manifestations	of	alexithymia;	intact	interoceptive	accuracy	among	those	with	heightened	alexithymia	may	preserve	aspects	of	subjective	emotional	experiences.		Fortunately,	interoceptive	accuracy	and	some	other	deficits	appear	to	change	with	the	introduction	of	short	and	relatively	simple	interventions.		 Future	studies	should	continue	investigating	the	parameters	of	these	deficits	in	emotional	experiences	in	alexithymia	and	how	they	manifest	in	various	forms	of	physical	
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and	mental	health	disorders.		The	laboratory-based	task	presented	in	this	study	holds	promise	for	continued	investigation	of	multiple	domains	of	emotional	processing	simultaneously.		By	better	understanding	emotional	deficits	in	alexithymia,	interventions	can	be	carefully	crafted	to	target	specific	deficits	and	improve	function	and	the	vast	group	of	individuals	impacted	by	alexithymia.			
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APPENDIX		 Film	Title	 Brief	description	of	scene	 Target	Emotion		 Additional	Emotions		
When	Harry	Met	Sally	 Sally	fakes	orgasm	in	a	crowded	restaurant	 Amusement		 n/a		
Robin	Williams	Live	 Robin	Williams	does	standup	comedy	 Amusement		 n/a		
My	Bodyguard	 Young	man	gets	bullied	 Anger		 Disgust		
Cry	Freedom	 Soldiers	shoot	children	in	Apartheid	scene	 Anger		 n/a		Stock	Beach	Scene		 Seagulls	walk	along	beach	 Contentment		 Happiness		Stock	Wave	Scene		 Waves	crash	in	ocean	 Contentment		 n/a		Stock	Amputation	Scene		 Arm	being	amputated	 Disgust		 n/a		
Pink	Flamingos	 Woman	eats	her	dog's	feces	 Disgust		 n/a		
Silence	of	the	Lambs	 Woman	hides	from	serial	killer	 Fear		 Tension,	Interest		
The	Shining	 Boy	walks	into	ominous	room	 Fear		 Tension,	Interest		
Bambi	 Bambi's	mother	shot	and	killed	 Sadness		 n/a		
The	Champ	 Boy	watches	hero	die	after	a	boxing	match	 Sadness		 n/a		
Sea	of	Love	 Pigeons	unexpectedly	fly	at	man's	face	 Surprise		 n/a		
Capricorn	One	 Man's	apartment	unexpectedly	raided	 Surprise		 n/a		
Appendix	A.		Emotion	inducing	clips	and	formulation	of	“target	emotion”	variable.	Gross	and	Levenson	(1995)	show	videos	occasionally	elicit	more	than	the	“target”	emotion	reliably.		In	the	current	study,	“target	emotion”	variable	constitutes	percentage	of	times	the	target	emotion	or	additional	emotions	listed	here	were	selected.		For	more	details	about	the	clips	utilized,	please	reference	Gross	and	Levenson	(1995).		 	
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	 Gross	and	Levenson	(1995)	original	emotions	Amusement	 Fear	Anger	 Happiness	Arousal	 Interest	Confusion	 Pain	Contempt	 Relief	Contentment	 Sadness	Disgust	 Surprise	Embarrassment	 Tension	Additional	emotion	words	adapted	from	PANAS	(Watson	et	al.,	1988)	Distress	 Irritated	Enthusiasm	 Jittery	Excitement	 Nervousness	Guilt	 Pride	Hostility	 Shame	Inspiration	 Strength	Interest	 Upset	Additional	words	from	piloting	Calm	 Pity		
Appendix	B.	Comprehensive	list	of	secondary	emotion	words	and	their	sources.	 	
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Variable	Name	 Scale	 Description	Target	emotion	 percentage	 Percentage	of	trials	target	emotions	words	are	selected	as	primary	Primary	intensity	 Likert	scale	 Intensity	of	primary	emotion	on	a	1-9		Likert	scale	(1=least;	9=most)	Subjective	arousal			 Likert	scale	 Subjective	arousal	following	each	film	clip	on	a	1-9	Likert	scale	using	SAM	rating	(1=least;	9=most)	Secondary	intensity	 Likert	scale	 Average	intensity	of	secondary	emotions	on	a	1-9	Likert	scale	(1=least;	9=most).	Target	emotion	RT	 seconds	 Average	RT	(latency	between	stimulus	onset	and	participant	response)	for	selecting	primary	emotion	Primary	intensity	RT	 seconds	 Average	RT(latency	between	stimulus	onset	and	participant	response)		for	reporting	primary	intensity	Subjective	arousal		RT	 seconds	 Average	RT	(latency	between	stimulus	onset	and	participant	response)	for	reporting	subjective	arousal	Secondary	intensity	RT	 seconds	 Average	RT	(latency	between	stimulus	onset	and	part-icipant	response)	for	providing	secondary	intensity		Target	composite	 frequency	 Frequency	of	endorsing	"no	emotion"	and	"confusion"	as	target	emotion	Negative	granularity	 r	to	z	transform	 Average	ICC	between	intensity	ratings	of	negative	secondary	emotions,	transformed	with	Fisher	r	to	z	,	and	subtracted	from	one	Positive	granularity	 r	to	z	transform	 Average	ICC	between	intensity	ratings	of	positive	secondary	emotions,	transformed	with	Fisher	r	to	z,	and	subtracted	from	one	Total	secondary	words	 frequency	 Number	of	secondary	emotions	in	which	intensity	>1	averaged	across	inductions	Positive	Dialecticism	 Log10	trans-formed	ratio	 Log10	transform	of	ratio	of	positive	to	negative	words	endorsed	following	a	negative	emotion	induction	Negative	Dialecticism	 Log10	trans-formed	ratio	 Log10	transform	of	ratio	of	negative	to	positive	words	endorsed	following	a	positive	emotion	induction	Interoceptive	Accuracy	 %	 1	-	100*((actual	heartrate	-	perceived	heartrate)/(actual	heartrate)))	Interoceptive	Confidence	 Likert	scale	 Rating	of	confident	in	heartbeat	estimation	(1	=	lowest;	9	=	highest)	Interoceptive	Difficulty	 Likert	scale	 Rating	of	difficulty	of	heartbeat	detection	task	(1	=	lowest;	9	=	highest)	Body	Mass	Index	(BMI)	 ratio	 weight	(kg)/height	(m)2	
Appendix	C.	Depicts	an	overview	of	primary	task	variables	and	how	they	were	formed.	
Note:		RT	=	response	time;	ICC	=	intraclass	correlation.		Aggregate	variables	listed	here	form	basis	for	variables	assessed	in	experiment	one	and	experiment	two.			
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	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	1.Target	Emotion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	2.Target	Composite	 -0.52***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	3.Primary	Intensity	 0.15	 -0.13	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	4.Target	Arousal	 0.12	 -0.19*	 0.43***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	5.Total	Emotions	Endorsed	 0.12	 -0.21*	 0.35***	 0.25**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	6.Secondary	Intensity	 0.05	 -0.15	 0.64***	 0.33***	 0.82***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	7.Target	Emotion	RT	 0.01	 -0.20*	 0.12	 0.02	 -0.07	 -0.01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	8.Primary	Intensity	RT	 -0.06	 -0.18†	 -0.15	 0.03	 -0.12	 -0.21*	 0.55***	 	 	 	 	 	 	9.Primary	Arousal	RT	 0.00	 -0.22*	 0.00	 -0.06	 0.02	 -0.04	 0.42***	 0.50***	 	 	 	 	 	10.Secondary	Emotion	RT	 0.07	 -0.39***	 0.23*	 0.13	 0.45***	 0.36***	 0.51***	 0.53***	 0.55***	 	 	 	 	11.Negative	Dialecticism	 -0.05	 -0.13	 0.20†	 0.24*	 0.54***	 0.47***	 0.00	 -0.15	 0.03	 0.30**	 	 	 	12.Positive	Dialecticism	 -0.19†	 -0.05	 -0.01	 0.00	 0.26**	 0.25**	 0.09	 0.04	 0.14	 0.36***	 	 	 	13.Negative	Granularity	 0.24*	 -0.21*	 -0.12	 0.00	 -0.34***	 -0.34***	 -0.01	 -0.09	 -0.21*	 -0.08	 0.06	 -0.02	14.Positive	Granularity	 -0.13	 -0.02	 0.04	 0.04	 -0.15	 -0.03	 0.14	 0.06	 -0.03	 0.09	 0.14	 0.08	 .17†	
Appendix	D.		Spearman	correlations	between	all	major	task	variables	in	experiment	one.	†p	<	.10;	*p	<	.05;	**p	<	.01;	***p	<	.001.
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		 Experiment	1	 Experiment	2			 Original	 tb	 Control	 tc	 Meditation	Target	Emotion	 0.66(0.14)	 0.33	 0.66(0.12)	 0.80	 0.63(0.16)	Target	Composite	 1.27(1.45)	 -1.94	†	 1.79(1.36)	 1.00	 1.50(1.16)	Primary	Intensity	 5.86(1.02)	 0.62	 5.74(1.16)	 0.74	 5.92(0.99)	Subjective	Arousal	 4.55(1.14)	 -0.56	 4.67(1.23)	 1.08	 4.37(1.18)	Target	Emotion	RT	 8.83(2.71)	 -0.94	 9.34(3.23)	 0.88	 8.74(2.65)	Primary	Intensity	RT	 4.01(1.34)	 -0.60	 4.17(1.47)	 1.12	 3.82(1.24)	Subjective	Arousal	RT	 4.07(1.18)	 0.83	 3.88(1.29)	 -0.34	 3.98(1.17)	Secondary	Intensity	 2.06(0.54)	 0.49	 2.01(0.45)	 -1.40	 2.16(0.44)	Secondary	Emotions	 10.74(4.11)	 1.36	 9.75(2.65)	 -1.93†	 11.24(4.78)	Secondary	Intensity	RT	 1.47(0.40)	 -0.14	 1.48(0.38)	 -0.87	 1.55(0.37)	Negative	Granularity	 0.76(0.10)	 3.40**	 0.69(0.11)	 -0.36	 0.68(0.12)	Positive	Granularity	 0.81(0.12)	 5.98***	 0.67(0.14)	 0.12	 0.68(0.17)	Negative	Dialecticisma	 0.35(0.15)	 -0.58	 0.39(0.19)	 -1.03	 0.39(0.19)	Positive	Dialecticisma	 0.65(0.65)	 -1.13	 0.73(0.77)	 -0.01	 1.12(1.34)	
Appendix	E.		Depicts	means	and	standard	deviations	for	primary	performance	variables,	as	well	as	t-tests	comparing	the	original	data	from	experiment	1	with	the	control	condition	from	experiment	2.	Note.	at-tests	reflects	difference	in	log10	transformed	scores;		bReflects	t-tests	between	experiment	one	and	control	condition	of	experiment	two,	df	=	144;	cReflects	
t-tests	between	control	and	meditation	conditions	in	experiment	two,	df	=	74		 	 	 	
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